

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

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FEATURED IN THIS ISSUE:

The Transition of Administration, a symposium

O & M and the Small Group, by Robert T. Golembiewski

Realities of Regulation, by Victor G. Rosenblum

AUTUMN 1960

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Public Administration Review

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in this number

Clark D. Ahlberg, vice president of Syracuse University for administration and research, served in the New York State government throughout the Harriman administration, succeeding Paul Appleby as director of the budget in 1957. Upon the election of Governor Rockefeller, he became first deputy comptroller of New York State returning late last year to Syracuse where earlier he had been assistant dean of the Engineering College. He has served in a number of federal agencies and has written on the administration of government research programs, including New York State's research.

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Daniel P. Moynihan served in the New York State government throughout the Harriman administration, completing the term as acting secretary to the Governor. He is now director of the New York State Government Research Project of Syracuse University where he is writing a history of that administration. He has watched the progress of the Rockefeller administration in his capacity as secretary of the public affairs committee of the Democratic State Committee, the official program body of the opposition party in New York.

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The Transition of Administration

► Career administrators in the United States government and many states again are faced with the unknown of a new set of leaders. There is enough experience with political transitions, however, to reduce uncertainty and to suggest ways of strengthening the new administration at a time of great difficulty for it, when success or failure to grasp quickly the reins of government and master its machinery can affect the success of the new chief executive throughout his tenure.

Here, a student of federal transitions and two

participants in state transitions (who are also political scientists) explore the political, social, psychological and economic forces that have affected transfers of power. They turn our attention from the problem of maintaining continuity of government, which most often has been our focus, to the more resistant problem of achieving policy changes which the election appeared to mandate.

Due to the publication schedule, all of the articles were written before the election.

Transferring the Presidency: Variations, Trends, and Patterns

By LAURIN L. HENRY
The Brookings Institution

THIS year and at least every eight years hereafter, the national interest will be endangered by the possible impotence of a "lame duck" administration, by divided responsibility for national leadership between election and inauguration, by the administrative confusion of a simultaneous turnover of most of the top layer of federal officials, and by the possibility of either indecision or uninformed, irresponsible decisions by a new administration. Serious efforts are required both to maintain continuity in essential matters and to make the massive governmental machinery properly responsive to the touch of a new president with a fresh electoral mandate.

A presidential transition is also an opportunity for rewarding observations by the political scientist. It finds the central institutions of the federal government at a moment of crisis, with strengths, weaknesses, and inherent tendencies brought into sharp relief and the pace of change abnormally telescoped in time. A change in the person of the president not only stirs the institutional Presidency and the

executive branch but forces a redefinition of relationships between the president and Congress, the bureaucracy, the party organization, and other groups. All of this applies not only when one party replaces another but also when a man of the same party replaces the president and even when the vice president succeeds on the death of a president.

America's experience with presidential transition, though it offers no infallible guide to the future, can provide us with some general expectations and a sense of perspective and self-awareness that may be of comfort and possibly of aid in the months ahead.

Individual Differences

Some of the critical elements in a transition are the decisions or failure to make decisions in the lame duck period (between the election and the inauguration), the transfer or failure to transfer information from the old to the new administration so that those coming in can get hold of issues promptly, and the relation of the new administration to the career people—both the extent of new patronage and the relations of career and political employees, including mutual trust, cooperativeness, understanding, and satisfaction of expectations.

The transitions of the past fifty years have

NOTE: This paper was written before the election. The material is drawn almost entirely from the writer's book, *Presidential Transitions*, a study of the four most recent party overturns in the Presidency, published by the Brookings Institution in November 1960.

varied sharply. Some of the variations stem from circumstances of the moment, others from personalities. In the transition from Herbert Hoover to Franklin D. Roosevelt, for example, the great depression set a stage of crisis with which these men and their associates had to deal promptly during late 1932 and early 1933. One also feels instinctively that the course and outcome of events were considerably determined by the fact that Hoover and FDR were the kind of men they were and that matters might have gone much differently had Hoover been a Wilson or a Harding, and FDR a Truman or a Coolidge. While, as we shall see, transitions have observable similarities, we must leave ample room in our anticipation for the play of largely unpredictable events and personalities. Even individuals who have been on the political scene long enough to be familiar sometimes surprise us as they undertake new roles.

Some Tentative Generalizations

But the processes associated with the change of presidents have formed some broad patterns. One obvious pattern is that successions within a party tend to differ from those between parties on such points as relations between the outgoing and incoming presidents, staffing, and the position of the civil service. We can expect the problems of a President-elect Nixon to be somewhat different from those of a President-elect Kennedy. One must be a little vague about these differences because turnovers within the same party have been neither as numerous nor as recent as party changes, leaving us with insufficient examples for comparison.

The evidence is tenuous and perhaps controversial, but there is at least some basis in recent experience for suggesting that transitions tend to vary according to whether it is the Democratic or the Republican party that is assuming power from the other. In recent times the Democrats have picked presidents in the Jackson-Wilson-FDR tradition in contrast to the Whiggish types that the Republicans historically prefer and usually select. Comparison of the accessions of Wilson and FDR with those of Harding and Eisenhower, to take the two most recent examples on both sides, suggests the generalization that the arrival of a Democrat in the White House is

likely to lead to a short but dramatic transition, with the president dominating the stage, great emphasis on legislative program, and considerable administrative untidiness. New Republican presidents, however, appear to move cautiously, be more deferential to Congress, stress the unity of the cabinet or "the administration" as a corporate entity, and place emphasis on the managerial virtues; the transition lasts longer and one is never quite sure when it has ended. These party differences may not endure, of course.

Changing Conditions of Transition

There have been many gradual changes in transitions in this century. Particularly, the environment of transitions has changed the demands on those involved. With each succeeding transfer of power, responsibilities of government have seemed greater, the tension and stakes higher. Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson thought they had grave problems, and so they did—relative to their experiences and the means at hand. But they were transferring control of a government that was tiny under circumstances that were idyllic in comparison to Roosevelt's inheritance in the 1930's, or Truman's and Eisenhower's in the 1950's. Both 1933 and 1953, in their separate ways, were crisis years, but despite the gravity of the depression, Hoover and Roosevelt did not have to worry about the possibility that a localized shooting war might suddenly turn into a world nuclear war. In 1961, almost anything could happen in any region of the world requiring almost instantaneous decisions of the gravest import. In an era of military technology in which one may, if he is lucky, get at most a few minutes warning of thermonuclear devastation on the way, there is not time for the president and president-elect to play Alphonse and Gaston. Neither can one look lightly on the possibility of an administration arriving in office uninformed or uncertain of its purposes. The governmental environment places an increasingly higher premium both on continuity of policy and administration and on responsiveness to legitimately directed change under the direction of responsible political leadership.

Paralleling and partly in response to this growth in responsibilities has come a growth in means; each new president has more to do,

but he also has more to do it with. Early in this century, a new president had to try to get control of a government in which everyone but a few technicians and some of the clerks was as new as he was; he was limited to the things that he and a handful of trusted associates could personally know or direct. The development of modern bureaucracy, including the professionalized higher civil service in general and the specialized "arms of management" in particular, cushions against inadvertent change and increases the potentiality of purposeful change. To the uninitiated, such machinery as the budget system, the scheme of accounts, legislative clearance, policy staffs, and secretariats appears to complicate the job of taking over the government; to those who know how to use it, this machinery gives great leverage on policy and its execution.

The Twentieth Amendment

There has been one extremely important change in recent times in the constitutional and legal requirements governing presidential transitions. This is the Twentieth Amendment, ratified in 1933 after Roosevelt's inauguration.

The primary purpose of the amendment was to eliminate the lame duck legislative session in which a Congress that had been superseded by the election in November convened early in December until March 4. Unless a special session were called, the new Congress would not meet until December, thirteen months after its election and nine months after the president had been sworn in (if it had been a presidential year). Without reviving all the tales of irresponsibility of the lame duck Congresses, suffice it to say that these sessions preceding presidential inaugurations were not productive. The outgoing president was in no position to lead, and Congress was in no mood to follow. The main accomplishment was to enact the appropriations for the fiscal year opening the following July, thus committing the new president to sixteen months under his predecessor's budgets. Otherwise, the sessions usually were dissipated in legislative-executive sniping and partisan maneuvers. After a final demonstration of the futility of this arrangement in the closing months of President Hoover's term, it seemed both an act of mercy to lift this burden from

the back of the outgoing president and a sharp gain in responsiveness to provide for convening the new Congress two months after its election, on January 3.

The secondary purpose of the amendment was to shorten what had for some time seemed an unnecessarily long interval between the election and inauguration of the president. The tendency of the entire government to stick on dead center during those intervals had been well established, and it was an obvious improvement to shorten the interregnum by advancing inauguration day from March 4 to January 20. It was considered necessary to set presidential inauguration day some time after the convening of Congress to allow time for Congress to examine the returns from the electoral college and resolve the contest if no candidate received a majority.

On the whole, these changes have been for the better. Yet, when the amendment received its long-delayed first full test with the presidential change of 1953, related problems arose. The annual legislative cycle normally began seventeen days before the new president was sworn in. During that period, Congress convened and received the president's State of the Union message, budget, and economic report. The first of these is called for by custom, the latter two by law. After a fair amount of cogitation in the Bureau of the Budget and elsewhere, it was decided to try to live with this anomaly. On the surface this worked very well. President Truman submitted a State of the Union message that was a swan song rather than a legislative program, a budget that provided simply for carrying existing activities along at approximately their previous levels, and an economic report that provoked no special controversy. President Eisenhower submitted his own legislative program in a State of the Union message two weeks after inauguration and made piecemeal amendments to the budget, reflecting his policy changes, in time for Congress to consider them and vote the appropriations by the opening of the fiscal year.

But in a more subtle sense the new timing created serious difficulties for the incoming administration. President Eisenhower and his associates, while scrambling to get the budget revised, found themselves hard pressed to meet the other demands imposed by a regular

session of Congress. They were hit hard by requests for executive appearances before committees, for opinions on pending bills and commitments of all kinds. The administration, off balance, took some time to decide what it wanted, but the veterans of Congress, who had been organized and waiting since early January, were clear at the outset about what *they* wanted. Congress got one jump ahead in the traditional legislative-executive rivalry, while the administration was pressured into concessions and had to conduct essentially a delaying action in several important policy areas. Partly as a result of this, and partly as a reflection of President Eisenhower's general philosophy for dealing with Congress, there was no "congressional honeymoon." In contrast to the legislative achievements of Wilson's first year, or FDR's famous first hundred days, the Eisenhower administration's basic legislative program did not get before Congress until the second year.

Informal Bridges Between Presidents

The record shows a steady development of measures—most of them resting on little more than precedent and obvious utility—to preserve effective government between the election and inauguration and bring a new administration onto the scene in a reasonable state of readiness.

Communication Between Administrations

Communication between incoming and outgoing regimes is a delicate matter when the president and president-elect are of different political parties and have been, directly or indirectly, recent campaign opponents.¹ Early in this century most persons considered it inappropriate for the two men to pay any heed to the other's existence or to make any statements or take any actions that might possibly embarrass the other. There might be some private and very formal correspondence concerning the inaugural arrangements or domes-

tic affairs at the White House, but even this was often handled by intermediaries. When the president-elect appeared in Washington just before inauguration, he and his family were invited to tea at the White House, but no one would presume to mar such an occasion by talking of the state of the government's business. At the cabinet level, the outgoing department heads were expected to tidy up their establishments and introduce their successors around when they arrived; there might be an hour or two of conversation about the state of the department but that would be the extent of it.

But to some, these conventional restraints were beginning to gall at least as early as the Taft-Wilson turnover. In December, Taft privately invited Wilson to spend a few days with him at the White House. He was vague about the purpose, mentioning only that they might discuss matters connected with the administration of the White House, and Wilson shied away. A few days before inauguration, when a revolution in Mexico City endangered the lives of U. S. citizens there and aroused clamor for military intervention, some of Taft's cabinet members showed active interest in discussing the situation with their successors, if only they could find out who they would be. But the successors did not come forward; some of them, in fact, had not yet been designated.

In 1916, with the nation on the verge of war, Wilson concocted a plan to use in case he failed of re-election: he would appoint the president-elect as Secretary of State, and then he and the Vice President both would resign, thus accomplishing the turnover immediately through the operation of the Presidential Succession Act. However, the scheme was not needed then, and Wilson made no move to revive it or have any other relations with President-elect Harding after the election of 1920.

In 1932, President Hoover shattered precedent by inviting FDR to the White House to discuss pending international matters shortly after election. Under the spur of the depression emergency, FDR did go to the White House, twice, and established a modicum of cooperation with the Hoover regime, particularly with Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson. The results of this endeavor, however, were profoundly disappointing to Hoover since

¹In the only two in-party successions since 1900 (TR to Taft, Coolidge to Hoover), the President-elect had been a member of the preceding administration, so that the problem of putting him in touch with current governmental affairs did not arise. What would happen if the President-elect were of the same party as the President but a complete "outsider" remains a subject for speculation.

Roosevelt was quite unwilling to make the specific commitments about future policies that Hoover had in mind.

Twenty years later, President Truman began building bridges to both of his potential successors during the campaign itself. Basing his moves on some steps that had been taken during and after World War II to preserve a facade of national unity and bipartisanship in foreign affairs, he had both candidates briefed regularly by the Central Intelligence Agency. He also invited each of them to confer with him at the White House, but his invitation to General Eisenhower was handled so clumsily as to make it almost impossible for the latter to accept. Immediately after election he again invited Eisenhower to the White House, this time successfully, and urged the President-elect to send pre-inaugural representatives to the most important federal agencies, particularly the Budget Bureau and the State and Defense departments. Meanwhile, at Truman's urging, each department prepared voluminous written materials for the information of the new administration, and the cabinet members offered themselves for discussions with Eisenhower's department heads as soon as they came within range. Arrangements were made in most agencies of the government, even including the White House office, to have at least one of Truman's high-ranking appointees remain in the service of the new administration for a few weeks. While Truman's offers, like Hoover's, were not received by the incoming administration with the enthusiasm he thought they deserved, the subsequent arrangements marked a new high in formal efforts to maintain continuity and have the incoming administration "informed to the point of action" by inauguration day. They did have outstanding success in some agencies, perhaps most notably the Budget Bureau and the Treasury.

Truman later said that he had deliberately sought to establish the tradition that an outgoing president is expected to do all he possibly can to facilitate the transition to his successor. How solidly that tradition is established remains to be seen, but events since 1953 at least suggest an expectation that incoming and outgoing regimes will have early communication and a significant transfer of information. This now begins even before election. CIA briefings, when not immediately

offered during the 1956 campaign, were specifically requested by the opposition candidate and promptly granted. Similar briefings have been reinstituted almost as a matter of course in 1960. It would not appear unwarranted to expect further evolution of practices for liaison between incoming and outgoing regimes, both at the presidential and the departmental levels.

The President-Elect's Preparations

In addition to earlier and more effective liaison between new and old administrations, presidents-elect now prepare themselves earlier, more intensively, and in a more organized way.

Woodrow Wilson, for example, took a four-week vacation outside the country after election and continued to serve as Governor of New Jersey until March 1. In late December, he began to consult party leaders about his cabinet and future program. Aided by a one-man staff and a few informal advisers, he handled a great amount of detail personally. His cabinet was not completed until late February or announced until inauguration day; some of its members met each other, and Wilson, for the first time at the inauguration.

Since Wilson's time, the practice has changed steadily and greatly so that in 1953 Eisenhower had a personal staff of about 100 plus a large number of high-ranking consultants and advisers carried forward from the campaign. Eisenhower himself got only a few days' partial vacation after the election, but his preparations had more the flavor of a staff operation and less of a personal touch than those of his predecessors. Even before the election, some of his associates had retained a management consulting firm to work on the executive recruiting problem. The cabinet was chosen, announced, and some of its members actively preparing by the first of December. In late November and early December, Eisenhower flew to Korea to look at his most urgent policy problem. Committees were working on other policy issues and assembling material for messages to Congress by mid-December. As the days passed, Eisenhower headquarters at the Hotel Commodore in New York City took on the character of a "shadow White House," a development culminating in "cabinet" meetings a few days before inauguration.

It appears reasonable to assume that brisk activity of this sort will be normal for future presidents-elect. In fact, the increasing demands for decisions by the president-elect beginning shortly after election day may stimulate even earlier and more systematic efforts during the campaign itself to prepare for victory.

Persistent Problems and Patterns

Despite the variations and trends, there are several respects in which presidential transitions have shown striking similarities. From year to year the stage-sets and the actors change, but things are done and said that give the observer a sharp sense of *déjà vu*.

The Outgoing Administration

The outgoing administrations seem to be subject to characteristic debilities that appear early in the campaign year if the president is ineligible for re-election, and in any case become increasingly evident after election or whenever it appears definite that a new president will take over. Internally there is a loss of élan and a growing feeling of futility about pushing new projects. The original corps of political appointees melts away; since it is difficult to recruit good men from outside, there is an increasing tendency to promote from within the administration. Career types move up to fill the gaps. Whether controlled by the president's party or the opposition, Congress is restless, reluctant to follow the president's lead, and dominated by motives of partisan advantage. There is a disinclination to allow executive reforms or to confirm executive appointments, particularly for the out-of-Washington positions subject to patronage influence. International negotiations gradually come to a standstill as the administration reluctantly recognizes its inability to make commitments, and foreign nations—both friends and rivals—decide to await the arrival of the new administration. Throughout the government there is a slowdown in policy-making and an accumulation of matters deferred until next year. These tendencies, although varying in intensity and particulars, were evident in the last years of Taft, Wilson, Hoover, and Truman, and seem to be emerging under Eisenhower, although it is still too early to

tell how far they will develop before the end of his term.

Attitudes of New and Old

The outgoing president or other executive official tends to be conservative—not necessarily in economic or social doctrine but in feeling protective of existing governmental institutions and dubious about the possibility of rapid improvement or drastic change. He senses the historic continuity of the Presidency and the great federal departments. After several years immersed in the processes of policy-making and administration, he appreciates the complexity both of the processes and the issues. Having lived intimately with current problems, he doubts that anyone else could do much better with them, and he sees a serious possibility of great damage by a successor who is uninformed or irresponsible. He and his associates, weary and perhaps even a little cynical, have sympathy for the innocents who are soon to take up these burdens, even though the latter may be of the other party and have said some quite extreme things during the campaign. Therefore, with high motives and proud of it, the wise old hands offer to be helpful, to provide information, to do what they can to ease the transition and help the new group off to a fair start. They do not mean to pressure or try to bind their successors, yet there is the barely concealed hope that once the new people are in possession of the true facts they will perceive and give full credit to the wisdom of what has gone before.

The president-elect and those coming in with him tend to have a different approach, one that seems shallow and irresponsible to the outgoing group. Fresh from the campaign, the winners are confident that they know, or can readily discover, the right answers; if they are of the opposite party they are likely to be scornful of what has been going on in Washington. They suspect the outgoing president, when he tries to promote a smooth transition, of trying to sell them on continuing present policies, and even if they do not distrust his motives they see him as the captive of erroneous doctrines which give him an inadequate grasp of the realities of the situation and limit his perception of alternatives. Those coming in can appreciate the need for continuity in the obvious and mechanical sense,

but they have little interest in all the details of history, the nuances of why things are the way they are that seem so important to the outgoing officials. The newcomers have big plans for the future and see little worth learning or preserving from a worn-out regime.

These attitudes and behavioral tendencies (which I have perhaps made over-sharp for the sake of emphasis) characterized the new and old administrations of 1933 and 1953. They limited the effectiveness of the efforts to place information at the disposal of the new administration. They also made it difficult for the president and president-elect, when they conferred, to find common ground even on such great issues as the war debts and the banking crisis of 1933 and the Korean war of 1953. What one side regarded as plain fact, common sense, beyond dispute by reasonable men, the other side challenged. Problems of this sort, almost as much as the question of responsibility under the Constitution, make it difficult for presidents and presidents-elect to get together on courses of action during the curious interval in which one man has all the legal responsibility but the other has most of the effective political power.

Policy Problems

Platforms and campaign commitments notwithstanding, the essential character and political position of an administration are rarely clear at the outset; they emerge gradually as actions are taken and positions assumed on the most urgent issues. The first few months are likely to be filled with uncertainty, tension, and a certain amount of internal conflict as the new administration goes through a process of clarifying ambiguities and reconciling its policy commitments.

These adjustments are necessary partly because a candidate or a party tends to make an excess of promises and encourage an excess of hopes during a campaign, partly because a president must consider elements which, as a candidate, he cannot or need not. He must broaden his orientation from the party organization, his party's congressmen, and the mass-voting public and come to grips with the bureaucracy and his great nonvoting constituency abroad.

Furthermore, many strong leaders and factions with widely diverse views continue to

hold power in an American party even after it elects a president, and these views cannot be ignored. Each new administration has this problem. To take a few obvious examples, Wilson was pulled between the demands of the Bryan wing of the Democratic party and the expectations of the Eastern Democrats that he would be, while progressive, a sensible and "sound" sort of reformer. Harding had made commitments on several sides of the League of Nations issue. Hoover had promised to continue the conservative work of Coolidge but was simultaneously perceived as a great doer and builder. Roosevelt had promised many new programs to combat the depression, plus a balanced budget and a 25 per cent tax reduction. He also had conflicting commitments to national self-sufficiency and to international economic cooperation. Eisenhower had bid for the support of both the liberal and conservative wings of the Republican party; he had the problem of meeting foreign and defense commitments while reducing expenditures enough to satisfy Senator Taft and other patriarchs of Congress.

The anticipation and resolution of these problems provide much of the excitement and suspense of a transition period. While trying to iron out such conflicts, an administration may give the appearance of not knowing its own mind or trying to go in several directions at once. Higher civil servants, trying to sniff out the new policy, may receive conflicting scents from the party platform, the statements of the president, the conduct of the new departmental officers, and the acts of relevant congressional committees. If they guess wrong they are likely to be in trouble. There is mutual disenchantment between the new president and a few of his appointees, leading to premature resignations. The executive-legislative border is likely to be unstable as the administration, hoping to retain congressional favor and enhance prospects of its legislative program, defers to the wishes of congressmen on less-than-crucial matters and permits forays deep into the internal affairs of the executive branch. These phenomena, more or less normal at any time, tend to be frequent and accentuated during the transition period.

A Crisis for the Bureaucracy

Finally, the advent of a new administration is a crisis for the federal bureaucracy. With

the simultaneous turnover of most of the top political leaders, working relations with the career service are disrupted, organizational structure may be changed, and positions of individuals threatened. Instability persists for at least several months while the main personnel changes are being made and confidence re-established.

Until approximately the 1920's there was mass turnover with each party change because a large proportion of the employees were outside the merit system. In some agency headquarters almost everyone above the clerical level was fired, and in the field service even the clerks were replaced. During periods of party stability the merit system was extended, but with the next change of parties a resurgence of patronage pressure forced it back—though not as far back as it had been before the previous reform. Individuals trying to make careers of government service became increasingly vulnerable as they reached the higher positions, although some managed to survive because of personal qualities or because their political sponsors retained a strength that an administration even of the opposite party hesitated to challenge. From the viewpoint of the public, usually partially shared by the president, the problem was to keep the patronage surge within reasonable bounds for the first year-and-a-half; the midterm congressional elections ordinarily marked the turning point into a new phase of stability.

Resurgence of patronage pressure continues with each party change, although by 1953 the merit system had achieved such strength and coverage that there was no longer any serious question of mass turnover. But the argument continued in different form. Could a bureaucracy developed almost entirely under the Democrats, in which career men held managerial and policy-making positions all the way up to the assistant secretary level, properly serve the Republicans? While the bureaucrats themselves had little doubt of it, most of the Republicans had serious reservations. There was an initial period of suspicion and distrust. A number of high-ranking career people, who had become identified with controversial policies of the previous administration, were displaced; a new civil service category, Schedule C, was established in an effort

(not wholly successful) to clarify the right of department heads to say who should occupy the thin layer of policy-making jobs just below the presidential appointees; and in a few agencies a large-scale clearance system was instituted within the formal framework of the merit system to assure politically-acceptable choices even for civil service appointments. These measures coincided with a number of administrative reorganizations, a sizable reduction in force for economy reasons, and a massive loyalty-security drive, so that both motives and results became considerably confused. The bureaucracy was demoralized and seriously diminished in efficiency for at least two years, whatever gains in controllability might have been achieved.

Such things never can be proved, but it is my view that the Eisenhower administration seriously underestimated the hold on the bureaucracy of the civil service ideology that a career man can and must serve the administration of the day, and that in an effort to assure control it induced instability and admitted extraneous influences in appointments that probably diminished in the net its ability to get the policy results it wanted from the administrative system.

At any rate, the coming of a new president and a largely-new set of departmental administrators presumably will open another period of uncertainty and rapid adjustment in the upper bureaucracy. If there should be a change of parties the question of policy control is almost certain to be raised, but unless the next party overturn is delayed as long as the last one, the ordeal of the civil service is not likely to be as severe as it was in 1953 and 1954.

Neither the last transition nor the intervening years appear to have furnished any definitive solutions. Perhaps a dispersed and incohesive party system and a constitutional structure of separation of powers inevitably keep the bureaucracy vulnerable, subject at the outset of each new administration to measures intended to assure its responsiveness.

Summary

The extent to which the transitions of the future repeat the patterns of the past remains debatable. As historians often remind us, one of the problems with predicting on the basis

of history is that you can never tell whether people will learn or fail to learn from experience. Lessons learned or the irresistible pressure of events has speeded the preparation of incoming presidents, enlarged areas of

cooperation between new and old administrations, and cut the lame duck period during which decisions necessarily fall between them. Many problems of transition, however, remain unchanged.

Changing Governors—and Policies

By CLARK D. AHLBERG and DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN

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WHILE it appears mankind has ever lived in a time of transition, the problem occurs in state government but every two or four years. Doubtless its onset varies with each occurrence: for some administrations it comes quietly, an awakening of powers; for others it is a troubled, foreboding period, reflecting the darkening winter skies that accompany it.

For still others it begins with a crash of understanding. That is the way it began for the Harriman administration in New York State. The scene took place in a New York City hotel, five weeks after the election of 1954. For a month Harriman and his advisers had been furiously at work drawing up a "bold and adventurous" legislative program designed to alert the country that a resurgent Democratic party was back in power in New York if not yet in the nation. In Albany, the new Governor's budget director designate and his aides had spent the same period going over the state's finances, intent on getting a picture of the financial situation and a view of ongoing state programs. On the Saturday in question the two groups met. The budget director reported there were no surplus funds for new programs nor would existing taxes produce sufficient revenues to meet even the ongoing program costs. There was in fact a deficit; there had been one for nearly every year since the end of the war. The discussion of new programs would have to be recessed while they talked of new taxes.

Harriman's program advisers reacted with open incredulity if not hostility. The meeting broke up in an impasse. The revenue problems that preoccupied the budget staff had hardly occurred to the program staff. The two points of view met head on and for the moment the work of the incoming administra-

tion came to a standstill. But its transition period had begun.

Popularly the period of transition is viewed as the time of the new broom sweeping out the old mess, refurbishing the executive mansion with fresh ideas and new men. In reality it is frequently a time of disadvantage and difficulty for the new governor in his relations with the legislature and within his own branch of government. The danger, from the point of view of effective government at the state level is that these disabilities will become permanent, that the new governor will lose entirely his opportunity to gain leadership over the government at just that moment when he is commonly thought to be enjoying the "honeymoon" phase of his administration.

In New York State two changes in government have recently taken place in comparatively rapid succession. In 1954, after twelve years of Republican governor Thomas E. Dewey, the Democrat, Averell Harriman, was elected. Four years later he was in turn succeeded by a Republican, Nelson Rockefeller. The events of these transitions, occurring in the context of relatively constant political conditions elsewhere, reveal a number of the factors at work during such a period in New York.¹

The theme running through each of the events that follow is the difficulty of change: the difficulty of devising new programs, of financing them, of winning support for them, of implementing them. Concern with political transition has long been directed to the task

¹The authors, as members of the Harriman administration, write with a background of much fuller knowledge of the events of the transition from Dewey to Harriman than of the subsequent transition from Harriman to Rockefeller.

of providing stability and continuity to the processes of government. Clearly the newer task is to provide, as it were, an innovative element that will correspond to the function of government as an instrument of change and adaptation in a society constantly demanding both.

The Problem of the Out Party

The Republicans in the New York State legislature have more or less a permanent majority: Al Smith declared it unconstitutional for the Democrats to control the legislature and they have in fact done so for but three years of the twentieth century and then by accidents of national politics. Since 1942, however, the party division has been more geographic than ideological. Both the Democrats and Republicans are more or less impregnable in their respective strongholds. Their legislators generally represent the largely similar constellation of interests of the political establishments of large metropolitan areas. Notably since the ascendancy of the "modern" Republicans, brought about by Governor Dewey, there has been little sharp ideological conflict between the two groups in the legislature.

The Republicans, however, retain exclusive control of legislative business, allowing the Democrats little more than token participation and, to some minds, receiving only token opposition. (It is common for the budget to emerge from the finance committees without the minority members ever being given the opportunity to vote on reporting it out.) Having few strong ideological conflicts, the Democratic legislators generally acquiesce in their impotence. What little legislative patronage they get is used for local party purposes and the appointees generally offer little technical competence.

Given this situation, during periods of Republican governors the Democratic party almost completely loses touch with the affairs of the state government. By contrast the Republicans have available at all times a large legislative staff which serves the Republican state committee as well as the majority in the legislature. A Democratic gubernatorial candidate is left almost entirely on his own in developing campaign issues and, if elected, administrative programs. Except for the minority leaders and their counsel, no Democrat

associated with the legislature provided Harriman assistance of any significance during the 1954 campaign or its immediate aftermath. The Democratic platform and campaign statements were drawn up principally by returnees from the Democratic administration in Washington using what information they could glean from the New York City government and the various interest groups. Apart from the traditional charges of economic decline and government corruption, the platform followed closely the pattern and subject matter of the Republican program: where the Republicans tended to take credit for having implemented the most recent increments in the various ongoing programs, such as unemployment insurance and civil rights, the Democrats tended to propose the next.

In only three instances were major new proposals made in the Democratic platform: "Assumption of responsibility by the State for the care of the chronically ill, as now done in the case of tuberculosis and mental illness"; a state minimum wage of \$1.25; and a referendum on direct state aid for school construction. Whatever the merits of these proposals, they would have raised so many difficulties—the first would have required a vast increase in state expenditures—that once in office the Harriman administration changed them so completely as to constitute new approaches. Where the Democratic policy-makers had struck out on their own they completely lost touch with what they came to regard as reality once in office.

In contrast to Harriman in 1954, Rockefeller in 1958 had access to abundant sources of program information and ideas as a result of his party's position in the legislature. The Republican legislative leaders, supported by expert and experienced staff, had maintained a vigorous opposition to Harriman, accumulating in the process an impressive stockpile of information and some issues. Midway through the Democratic administration Rockefeller was made head of a state commission concerned with revision of the constitution. This provided him a year-and-a-half to assemble a staff, to inform himself on state problems and proposals for correcting them, and to appear before the voters in a responsible and non-partisan manner. When Harriman tried to put an end to this in 1958 by refusing to ap-

prove the continuation of the commission, it was re-established as a legislative body.

When the campaign arrived Rockefeller's top commission staff became his top campaign staff (as it later became his official staff). In rapid succession he issued a series of policy statements and speeches covering every major issue in state government, even discussing the need for a new state social insurance program to protect every wage earner against the danger of catastrophic medical expense. As events had it, a sharp economic recession and a development within the Democratic party led Rockefeller to concentrate on the issues of economic decline and political bossism—much the issues that had dominated Harriman's 1954 campaign—but at the same time Republican Rockefeller easily outdistanced Democrat Harriman as a proponent of more government action to the point of winning the last-minute support of the state's most "liberal" newspaper.

Rockefeller's election by 573,000 votes was a startling upset in the year of a historic Democratic sweep. It was brought about in measure by a heavy defection of voters from the liberal wing of the Democratic party—a movement certainly encouraged by the impression of vigor which Rockefeller was able to give as a result of the information and staff support he received from the legislature.

Clearly, a party lacking a vigorous legislative wing is handicapped in a gubernatorial campaign. If successful withal, it is likely to enter the transition period with little hard information concerning the task ahead.

By contrast, a party with too powerful a legislative wing will incline to be too little responsive to the policy objectives of even their own governor. Here the difficulty of changing policies arises from the absence of political necessity rather than from the shortage of technical ability and information.

Facing the Legislature

The new governor takes office only to find he must share power. The legislature, experienced, entrenched, indispensable, is there waiting for him. Having won the mandate of the people for his program, the governor now finds he must ask permission of the legislature to enact it. Conflict is inevitable: if there is a difference of party, the conflict is public and pronounced; if the parties are the same, a

kind of family quarrel ensues, no less bitter for being more private.

With Harriman's election the Republican legislative leaders assumed a new importance and independence; both promptly became candidates for the 1958 gubernatorial nomination. Reinforced by a number of Dewey officials who took staff posts in the legislature, they commanded unusual, perhaps unequalled, knowledge of the New York State government processes. After announcing their own legislative program a day before the Governor's Annual Message, they promptly moved to dispute his gloomy view of state finances.

Finances: The Challenge to Harriman

For his part, Harriman challenged the powerful and widely accepted image of his predecessor, Thomas E. Dewey, as a prudent, pay-as-you-go fiscal manager. Although the Democratic platform had challenged this image, asserting "for the last nine years the State has been spending far in excess of its income," it is doubtful that even those who wrote the plank really believed it—as witnessed by their first reaction to the report of their own budget director which confirmed it. During the campaign, Harriman declared there would be no need to increase income or business taxes in order to meet the needs of the state and its communities. His running mate even proposed reducing income taxes.

On recognizing the true fiscal condition, the new Governor declared in his opening budget message that the state had been operating at a deficit for all but two years of the postwar period. To restore the balance of state finances, Harriman called for a general tax increase of \$127.6 million, including the ending of the year-to-year tax forgiveness which amounted to some \$48 million. He declared this necessary to avoid an approaching deficit in the capital construction fund and to provide for "mandated" increases in state services. The Republican leaders, appropriately shocked, charged revenues were underestimated.

Almost immediately Harriman began to soften his stand. He had been elected during the 1953-54 recession; unemployment, which reached almost 6 per cent of the work force in the fall of 1954, dropped off to just over 4 per cent by mid-1955. As the session progressed, revenue estimates were revised up-

wards \$31 millions, a development of little significance in terms of the state needs or its fiscal problems but nonetheless the subject of widespread Republican comment. This contributed, late in February, to Harriman's decision to postpone the effective date of his proposed motor fuel tax increase until the beginning of the following calendar year. This cut out for 1955-56 one half his tax package. At the same time the "freeze" on new construction was withdrawn. A month later he agreed to a modified series of Republican-sponsored income tax reductions for "hardship cases" which he had earlier indicated would be vetoed unless accompanied by measures to replace the revenue loss.

In the end Harriman got not quite 30 per cent of the new tax revenues he proposed and then only by use of his veto power to end tax forgiveness legislation. However, as a result of the economic upswing, the revenue yield from the state tax structure was \$17.5 million more than he had predicted would result from the adoption of his entire new tax program. The revenue estimates approved by the new budget officials had failed badly to gauge the dimensions and significance of the economic recovery. The next year Harriman proposed a new type of personal income tax forgiveness and a reduction in the unincorporated business tax, thus ending even the tax gains he obtained in 1955 by means of his veto.

Finances: The Challenge to Rockefeller

Rockefeller's campaign in 1958 was marked by the number of new programs and projects which he proposed. Although Harriman's staff privately estimated they would cost \$2,468,150,000 over a four-year period, he, like Harriman in 1954, indicated there would be no need for tax increases to pay for them. Early in the campaign he stated there would be no need even for Harriman's gas tax increase which by then the GOP legislative leaders and state chairman had agreed would be necessary. Rockefeller declared he would expand "needed social services" by pursuing policies of economic growth which would increase state revenues "without increasing the burden on the individual taxpayer." However, a national recession had once again reduced state revenues and new taxes were needed when Rockefeller took office. Most new programs had to be set aside.

Echoing Harriman, Rockefeller began his first budget message with the announcement that "New York is faced with the most serious fiscal problem of more than a generation." Like Harriman he blamed his predecessor but, again in parallel, the legislature was not long in blaming him. Before the session was concluded, the governor's authority had been dramatically shaken by a legislative revolt as had not been seen for a generation.

Finding himself in a situation seemingly identical to Dewey's, with the same legislative leaders, finance committee chairman, budget director, *et al.*, Rockefeller promptly restored the quasi-parliamentary practice which Dewey had instituted of weekly meetings with the legislative leaders to agree on the course of action for the coming legislative meetings. In this way a budget was drawn up calling for \$277 million in new taxes, including the gas and Diesel fuel taxes Harriman had sought four years earlier. Though a Draconic measure, there was clearly little expectation of difficulty: the Republicans had the votes; in twelve years Dewey's budget had been cut but once. As if to emphasize that it would be easy, the gas tax increase was put through on a straight party vote before the new budget was even submitted. Within weeks, however, this masterful procedure was reduced to shambles.

Three factors seem to account for this. First, the public reaction was very bad, ranging as one upstate paper put it, "from rage to resignation." This was the aftermath of a Republican campaign which talked of tax cuts and new programs, not tax increases. Harriman had had a similar reaction of disbelief, particularly from the press. Second, the Republican legislature, after four years of vigorous opposition to "High Tax Harriman," found it difficult to adopt so suddenly a new attitude to finances and, at the same time, to revert to its former subservience to the governor. Dewey had put an end to twenty years of Democratic rule in Albany; Rockefeller became the head of a party whose legislative leaders regarded the Republicans as the normal holder of executive authority and felt no unusual obligation to him as the current incumbent, particularly as he was ideologically far to the left of most of his party in the legislature. Third, in an unusual election development, the Democrats managed to retain the office of state comptroller. This gave

them a center of informed opposition, much as would be provided by an active and well staffed legislative party.

Within a week of the budget message, *The New York Times* reported mounting opposition among Republican legislators to the governor's proposals. The Democratic comptroller spearheaded the attack with the charge that the proposed revisions in the income tax were regressive and, further, would yield from \$80 to \$107 million more revenue than the governor estimated. This charge, although promptly challenged, was supported by a detailed economic analysis and gained increasing acceptance. In time it was taken up by the Republican majority leader of the Senate and the leaders of what became known as "the Budget Revolt." On February 27th, *The New York Times* reported that the revolt had been joined by sufficient Republican assemblymen to defeat the Rockefeller budget.

Weeks later, but only after the elimination of the Governor's proposed forgiveness of the 1958 tax on capital gains, an increase of tax credit for individuals from \$10 to \$25 to counter the "soak-the-poor" charges of the Democrats, and a \$40 million cut in the budget itself which the Governor had agreed to accept, the legislature finally passed the administration tax program—by a margin of two votes.

Pursuing the Harriman parallel to the point of destiny, Rockefeller's revenue estimates blew up on him as well. He, too, had been elected at the peak of a recession. The unemployed percentage of the work force dropped from 7.4 per cent in the autumn of 1958 to 5 per cent in the spring of 1959 and continued to drop. With the business recovery and the effectiveness of withholding taxes, money came rolling in. The state completed the 1959-60 fiscal year without using the \$133 million in bond funds that had been programmed and with an actual increase in its cash assets. In June 1960, within two months of the close of his first fiscal year, Rockefeller suddenly announced a \$120 million increase in his second year revenue estimates and promised a \$90 million tax cut on 1960 personal incomes. But already on the preceding day the Senate majority leader had announced that the Republican members of the Senate had unanimously pledged themselves to a 10 per cent tax cut in 1960-61, an objective they

had sought in the legislative session just ended but which the Governor had blocked.

As a result of the Harriman and Rockefeller transitions, the balance of executive-legislative power in New York State had come to a more nearly even point than at any time since the establishment of the executive budget system by Alfred E. Smith in 1927.

Finances: The Limit on Innovation

This New York State experience suggests that the range of practical policy choices open to new governors is limited by the financial commitment of existing programs and the relative inflexibility of state revenues. This essentially determines the difference between state and national politics. Change costs money. In New York, where some 60 per cent of all noncapital state expenditure goes as aid to local government and 75 per cent of state operating funds are required to run institutions, not much money can be had by cutting back existing programs. Capital programs provide the best opportunity, but even here it takes twelve to eighteen months to slow down (or step up) a capital program. As matching federal capital grant programs increase, significant cuts in this area may become too "expensive" to contemplate.

During both the Harriman and Rockefeller transitions, such fiscal considerations were dominant. Both governors were elected during a recession and took office before the extent of the recovery was discernible. Both found new taxes required to finance the ongoing government, and both abandoned election objectives of stepped-up state programs to deal with a revenue crisis. The national economy, both on the downturn and the upsurge, fixed the limits of the real policy alternatives for these new governors as must be true in nearly all states.

This also points to the crucial importance in the New York State experience of a knowledge of the state's financial problem as a basis of policy planning in the campaign period. Harriman did not have the necessary staff, the legislative assistance, or a budget document which provided this information when he won in 1954. Rockefeller had this financial data but failed to use it or thought it unwise to do so. Hence neither winning candidate prepared the voters in advance of his election for the fiscal policy he eventually adopted.

Instead, each campaigned on the basis of new programs and new services to be financed by a resurgent state economy which he promised to bring about.

Finally, this experience would support Balfour's dictum that whichever party is in office the conservatives are in power. This has rarely been more evident than in the transitional phase of the Harriman and Rockefeller administrations when the boldest innovators were reduced to "marginalistic incrementalism"—or whatever the Russians would call it—by the automatic and built-in increases in the cost of the ongoing government programs and the money shortage resulting from an economic downturn.

Challenge to the Chief

In New York as elsewhere a number of important activities are carried out by officials whose terms of office extend beyond that of the governor who appoints them. A new governor almost never starts with control over these activities and may for some time find himself dealing with executive agencies which are actively hostile.

The Dewey administration, which had known for some time that 1955 would bring a change of governor if not of party, took the precaution of ensuring that most of these agencies would remain Republican for some time. The terms of the Thruway Authority members, just taking over direction of the world's longest limited access highway, were staggered to ensure Republican control throughout the succeeding administration. The Power Authority, engaged in the enormous enterprise of harnessing the St. Lawrence and Niagara Rivers, was scheduled to remain Republican for three years; the Public Service Commission was tied up for four. In fact, Rockefeller found most of the commissions and authorities still in the hands Dewey had left them though this may not have been true had Harriman anticipated defeat. With a Republican legislature to support them, these agencies constituted an important opposition enclave within Harriman's executive branch.

This problem was acerbated for Harriman by uncertainties about the neutrality of the state civil service. In New York, as in Washington, the government had grown enormously during the 1940's. Harriman found

a civil service greatly expanded by the Republicans, including large groups that had entered state service by special devices. Eisenhower was confronted with a similar situation in 1953. The Dewey civil servants had become accustomed to working with the Republican legislators and found the habit hard to break, which gave rise to further suspicions, as did the fact that many of the Democratic legislators regarded these civil servants as "Dewey men."

The situation was made still worse for the Democrats by the fact that the Republicans were scheduled to control the Civil Service Commission for the first half of Harriman's four years. This would have prevented the creation of exempt jobs at the high civil service level which enables a governor to underpin his commissioners with deputies and aides in whom they have confidence. The anomaly of this situation was such that the Republican chairman of the commission resigned in order to give the new Governor a freer hand in organizing his administration.

When Rockefeller succeeded Harriman he found a civil service but little changed from that which Dewey left, and correspondingly a source of less apprehension, but even so a Democratic member of the Civil Service Commission was persuaded to resign in order to give the new Governor control over his personnel department, thus repeating and perhaps establishing the sensible practice begun in 1955.

In the best of circumstances, power can easily slip away from a governor during the transition period, as in the case of Harriman and the State University. After much Democratic pressure (this was one of the rare issues on which the Democrats were active during the Dewey era) the University was begun somewhat tentatively in 1948; a permanent board of trustees was not authorized until 1954, and it had not been appointed by the time of Harriman's election. This gave him an opportunity to identify himself and his party with a new institution of great importance and increasing political significance in an area of crowded colleges. However, in the context of a rumor that Dewey would call a special legislative session to confirm the appointments, and as a courtesy to the outgoing Governor, Harriman agreed to accept the recess appointment of a board of fifteen per-

manent trustees, of whom only one was chosen by him. The board chairman, chosen by Dewey and redesignated by Harriman, was an active Republican political leader who had served as state comptroller and lieutenant governor under Dewey. The chairman seized the initiative in January by calling for a \$250 million bond issue for the State University together with a program for student loans and increased state scholarships awarded on the basis of need. As the Governor's annual message had contained no proposals of any kind relating to the State University, and with the budget at the printers, this proposal filled a vacuum. In time the Harriman administration proposed and pushed for more state scholarships based on need and for the State University bond issue but it could not claim exclusive credit for them. Eventually the board chairman emerged as Rockefeller's chief supporter for the gubernatorial nomination and thereafter as one of his closest campaign advisers and one of his first appointees as Governor.

A New York governor has far less problems with overlapping term commissions than do most heads of states. He appoints nearly all department and agency heads. Even so, the State Power Authority, the Public Service Commission, the State Education Department, the Department of Social Welfare, and the State Thruway Authority all remained outside Governor Harriman's direct control through most of his administration. The most visible and frequent consequences were minor political opposition, withholding of information, and nonresponsiveness, but seldom with respect to any real policy issue or program objective. There is admittedly too little data to justify a firm conclusion, but we would question the wisdom of this method of policy insulation on the state level.

Strange Bedfellows

Both Harriman and Rockefeller recruited and kept on personal staffs of pronounced liberal views. In each administration, policy formulation was or is in the hands of persons considerably to the left of their party's center. These ideological differences tend to be associated with more general group differences. Thus of Harriman's seven principal staff aides, five were Protestant, two Jewish. None was Catholic, although Catholics predominate

in the New York Democratic party, and only one was a regular party man. By contrast, of the twelve department heads originally appointed by Harriman, seven were Catholic, four Jewish and only one, a "nonpartisan" holdover from Dewey, was Protestant. Five of the seven who were Catholics and two of the four who were Jewish were party regulars.

An instance, of small matter but considerable significance, of the type of misunderstanding that can arise in such circumstances occurred early in the Harriman administration. As liberal Democrats, personally and ideologically involved with the conduct of foreign affairs under Roosevelt and Truman, Harriman and his staff were perhaps more easily aroused by the loyalty issue as it emerged during the McCarthy period than by any other current political conflict. This sensitivity was sharpened when the legislature raised the issue with regard to two of the Governor's most trusted cabinet aides. One of the first orders of business in the new administration was to revise what were regarded as exaggerated state security regulations. Several months later the Governor and his staff learned in the newspapers that one of the new department heads, a regular Democrat, was requiring all applicants for licenses issued by his agency to fill out questionnaires regarding membership in subversive organizations, a practice never previously required and clearly contrived with the object of getting political "mileage" out of the communist issue. This was the type of measure which brought fire to the eyes of liberals at that time. The department head promptly withdrew his order, but the episode illuminated the gulf of understanding on certain issues which separated the two wings of the administration team.

Governor Rockefeller's personal staff is drawn principally from the liberal wing of his party, while his cabinet ranges across most of the Republican spectrum. In this situation, essentially identical to Harriman's, it would be no cause for surprise if similar tensions were to arise.

In line with their tendency to ideological differences, party regulars present the familiar problem of dual loyalty—to their political sponsors as well as to the administration. Quite apart from any substantive difficulties, such persons rarely have a highly developed

sense of the importance of working for or through the governor—far less through the governor's pink-cheeked staff. The regulars frequently find themselves more easily working directly with the legislature, and are, of course, much more readily distracted by matters of importance to the locality from which they happen to come.

Difficulty in Grasping the Reins

With rare exceptions, the new cabinet appointees of the Harriman administration came to their posts with little knowledge of their program assignments. They were not well prepared to assist the new Governor in framing his first legislative program and appeared to have much difficulty with the notion that he would assess their performance more with regard to the new ideas they produced than the quality of their administration of ongoing programs. Lacking confidence in their own information, they tended to embrace the "policy view" of the career civil service, which was often sound but seldom sensitive to the Governor's view or that of his party. Nor was it responsive to the Governor's need for original proposals, tending rather to produce extensions of the programs of the previous administration.

It appears that the Rockefeller administration has attempted to avoid this difficulty by looking outside the government for new ideas. At least one Rockefeller cabinet member has commented that he spends more of his time discussing his programs with outside advisers to the governor than in consultation within the government. This could be regarded as an extension of the existing practice in New York of relying heavily on temporary state commissions for new policy proposals. If it eliminates the problem of developing a creative career service, it may also tend to produce wild ideas on the one hand and decidedly dull civil servants on the other.

Contrary to frequently held opinion, a governor cannot always appoint men who will be loyal both to him and to some ideal of service beyond party. Nor is the number of party appointments necessarily a measure of political independence or lack of it. New York State government finds it difficult to attract first line talent to appointive posts. Although New York pays as good or better salaries than the federal government, Harriman was never able

to attract to Albany an adequate supply of the type of persons who would willingly serve in Washington. It became a recognized rule that a less-than-adequate party nominee need never be accepted unless there were no better candidates available, but frequently there was none. Asked what were the *de facto* qualifications for a particular class of legal patronage, one of Harriman's secretaries wistfully replied: "Five years' unsuccessful practice of the law." Alternatively, this situation encouraged the hiring of young persons with limited experience but considerable promise, often at comparatively high salaries.

One consequence of the difficulty of recruiting qualified officials, particularly in the seven or eight weeks between the election and inauguration, is that a number of the key personnel of the preceding administration are given the opportunity to stay on for varying periods under the new regime. New commissioners without prior experience are inclined to regard an incumbent deputy or counsel or other experienced appointive officials as indispensable to their own transition. The tendency was marked in the Harriman administration, much less so during the Rockefeller transition when many former Dewey officials reappeared at once and even larger numbers were available.

In the Harriman administration this practice appeared to impede the achievement of control by the Governor rather than to ease it. The very efficiency of holdover deputies and legal counsel served to postpone for many new officials the actual date of coming to grips with their duties. A career service such as New York's embodies more than enough competence needed for day to day affairs and inclines to place considerably more than enough emphasis on the value of continuity in policy and program. In these circumstances a "throw the rascals out" policy is likely to have long-term advantages for the new governor that outweigh the short-run value of avoiding early mistakes.

Proposals

The recent New York state experience with transitions points to the curiously decisive problems of this transition period. At least four suggestions may have value in other situations.

1. *The state fiscal situation can and should be made known to the new governor.*

The New York practice of inviting the new governor to have his budget director participate in the budget hearings that normally begin a week after election is clearly of value. It enabled both Harriman and Rockefeller to present major tax programs which were largely of their own making, for in both cases the incumbent director dropped out of the process once the hearings were completed.

A complete and comprehensive budget document and comparable financial reports can contribute to a responsible political campaign. In New York state, lack of these materials prior to Harriman made it difficult if not impossible to talk intelligently about the state's financial problem. Perhaps of greater interest is the fact that the data were available in 1958 but were not used until after the campaign.

In so far as this recent New York experience is relevant, it also points with great emphasis to the importance of revenue estimates. A professional civil service staff of quality, both in the state tax department and budget division, applied advanced techniques but failed badly to gauge the revenue significance of the 1954-55 and 1958-59 economic upturns on the yield of the state tax structure. A more accurate estimate might have transformed the character of the transition periods of both Harriman and Rockefeller. Here is a specific opportunity for improvement within the scope of professional public administration. Similarly, it points to the difficulty of constitutional procedures such as New York's which require that the budget be submitted to the legislature on or before the first day of February. Printing schedules mean that the budget must be completed by mid-January—too soon for the administration to master its details and, more importantly, too soon to make use of the all-important revenue indications that appear at the end of the calendar year. Much could be said for delaying the submission of a new administration's first budget for a period beyond the customary date, perhaps, in a case such as New York's, until the middle or end of February.

This further points to the importance of the pre-inaugural period as a time of preparation. Certainly this period should not be shortened. Rather, there is a need for develop-

ing practices that will assist the governor-elect to make the most of the fleeting weeks available to him. The informal practice in New York of engaging certain of the governor-elect's aides as paid budget consultants made available professional assistance on most satisfactory, noncommittal terms.

2. *The governor's role in routine government business, particularly legislative business, should be institutionalized to provide continuity without overwhelming the executive during his first months.*

As much as half the thousand and more bills passed by the New York legislature each year are departmental measures of a nonpolitical character. The necessity to act on these measures seriously burdened Harriman's staff during his first legislative session. This came at a time when the legislature (and perhaps some of the departments as well!) yielded to the familiar temptation to try to slip by the new Governor measures which would not pass the scrutiny of more experienced eyes. To alleviate this situation in the future the Harriman administration instituted the practice of pre-clearance by the Budget Division of all departmental legislation. Before any such measures were introduced, they were studied, approved and logged by the Division, acting as a staff unit for the Governor's counsel. This system provided the incoming Rockefeller administration with a complete record of all departmental legislation pre-filed for the forthcoming 1959 session, as well as a system for reviewing and coordinating all such measures throughout the legislative period. It gives the new governor at least a fighting chance in his opening duel with the legislature.

3. *Each party should have a vigorous legislative wing which fully participates in the legislative process.*

The only thing that corrupts more than power is lack of it. An effort should be made to avoid the continuous dominance of one party in legislatures. New York is roughly divided between New York City and the rest of the state. The legislature for the city is twenty-five to one Democratic; the legislature for the state is as permanently Republican; neither is as good as it could be, and the source of diffi-

culty in both is the absence of a vigorous minority.

This situation almost certainly could be helped in New York State by the innovation of a bipartisan legislative council and staff which would ensure that minority as well as majority members would have access to information on government issues and programs and which would in that measure make an informed opposition at least possible. While the legislative council may not have lived up to its full potential, when you are in the basement so far as a bipartisan staff is concerned, as is the New York State legislature, the only way you can go is up.

4. The career service should be responsive to the problems of transition.

The practice begun by the Republicans and continued by the Democrats of turning over the civil service commission to the new governor is a sound step. Nothing does greater harm to the career service than to wall it off, as against a natural enemy, from the influence of the chief executive. First impressions remain. If the first impression a governor has of his civil service is that of a hostile and vigilant garrison entrenched behind statutes which he must somehow breach, both are in for troubled careers. Direction of the civil service should be turned over to the new governor promptly as his greatest source of strength during the period of transition—and as one of his principal responsibilities throughout his administration.

Correspondingly, the time of transition is one of great opportunity for the civil servant who will come forward with ideas and proposals. The tendency is to stay out of sight.

It is a rare bureau chief who is ready for his new commissioner with a summary of the laws affecting the department or a list of suggestions for new legislation or for implementing the more viable campaign commitments of the victorious party. Those who are ready rarely regret it. Their rewards are fully their due, for a civil servant is never more valuable, surely, than when he is abetting the processes by which the citizenry choose to have things done differently. The important role the civil servant plays in contributing to responsible social change should be emphasized in training for public service.

The professionalization of government service and the concept of "permanent status" are marks of a complex society. Yet there is wanting a greater awareness among civil service career staffs of the essentially conservative consequences of such arrangements, most particularly in areas of government not subject to the pressures of social conflict. This traditional strength of the career service is its greatest weakness when it results in the tendency to resist change and adjustment wherever the values of elected officials conflict even slightly with established professional and career service values. Engineers, educators, doctors, social workers, nurses, to mention but a few, were among the groups most resistant to suggestions for change and quickest to sense "politics" where the slightest adjustment or shift in emphasis was proposed. Thus the prospect emerges that the ease of transition in administration will be in inverse proportion to the professionalization of the bureaucracy: hardly the outcome sought by the merit system, but doubtless a commentary on American professional education as a preparation for public service.

Computer Talk

A programming system that employs simple English words to instruct an electronic computer—rather than the complicated numerical jargon now understood only by computer specialists—has been developed. . . .
—Press Release, RCA News, August 25, 1960.

Now if administrators can be taught simple English. . . .

O & M and the Small Group

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WORK in the tradition of F. W. Taylor's "scientific management" often has been spectacularly successful. Many times, however, changes in procedure or in formal organization founder on the unanticipated behavior of the persons involved. In these cases, a mechanics is clearly insufficient; a psychology is necessary, too. Furthermore, the organization of work involves a broader range of values than is usually acknowledged.

The O & M man (or administrative analyst) generally would recognize these limitations of his approach. But he would be likely to explain that behavioral science does not provide a theory which he can apply to include the psychological aspects of organization change. He is left with the insight into human reactions his experience provides. As to values, the O & M man is likely to eschew the obligation to seek any but the traditional goals of his trade, efficiency and economy.

Much recently-gathered information on the behavior of groups, however, can be applied directly in O & M work. Moreover, this information forces a value choice, for it outlines a way to achieve efficiency and economy which differs from the traditional O & M approach. This alternate way has markedly different social and psychological impact. A choice, then, cannot be avoided by claiming a "one best way" to organize a work process.

A revisit to an application of traditional O & M techniques to low-level work processes in a federal agency will illustrate this double-barreled usefulness of small-group theory.¹

¹Harold Stein (ed.), *Public Administration and Policy Development: A Case Book* (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1952), pp. 1-13; and Bureau of the Budget, *Production Planning and Control in Office Operations*, Management Bulletin (U. S. Government Printing Of-

ice, October, 1949). These two sources do not always agree.

➤ Social scientists have contributed to the improvement of public administration by deepening our vision of the events that go on around us—clarifying for us our role, our own behavior, and that of our superiors and subordinates so we are better able to predict and plan. Here we are shown how research on the behavior of small groups can help to guide us through an actual and typical government management problem, an effort to increase productivity by reorganizing a work process.

The theory, in addition, also will outline the weaknesses of the O & M application which a second reorganization soon had to meet.

A Thumbnail Case Study

In July 1945, the Patent Copy Sales Branch (a division of the Patent Office, U. S. Department of Commerce), from which copies of a myriad of patents are ordered, had accumulated a three-month backlog of work. This condition prompted an O & M study resulting in a reorganization in early 1946.

On an agencywide basis, the reorganization channeled as much work as possible into a single flow. The reorganization emphasized specialization by process. Coding orders, sorting them, pulling copies of patents from the files, and assembling and mailing them became the four major work stations as all orders flowed in a single stream. Before the reorganization, in contrast, the work flow was "parallel," separated into six major lines of

Various points were clarified with officials of the agencies involved. Action-sequences have been reconstructed consistent with the recollections and records available. Unfortunately, checks of all points were not possible.

The financial aid of the Princeton University Research Fund in this phase of the research is gratefully acknowledged.

flow according to the sources of orders for patents. Work units also performed a single process, but within each line of flow (with the one exception that copy pullers did their own sorting). But some lines were too rushed, some had too little work.

Of particular interest here is the Copy Pulling Section, a unit of the Sales Branch. In the reorganization, the files holding the patent copies were demarcated into five units, of approximately equal expected workload but of unequal area. Each of the units, in turn, was separated into approximately seven segments of roughly equal workload. One copy puller was assigned to each segment. Newly-appointed supervisors—the highest producers prior to the reorganization—monitored each of the units.

Under the original organization, copy pullers might range over all two-and-a-half acres of files located on two floors in filling their orders. The change, then, was from specialization by source of order to specialization by area.

Several advantages were expected to result from these two basic changes. For the Copy Pulling Section, the expectation was that more orders could be filled with less walking, yielding higher productivity. For the Sales Branch as a whole, greater control of work flow was anticipated. According to the case-writer:

With a large volume of orders moving regularly through a single channel, work could be dispatched according to a predetermined time schedule, thus establishing a rhythmic beat or tempo of work. The resulting even flow would make it possible to determine staff needs at each work station with greater certainty than before, to plan and check the progress of current work, and to provide a psychological stimulus to worker production.²

The expected increase in productivity did not materialize immediately. The copy pullers resisted the attempt at greater control. They continued to pull 300 copies per day, their self-defined "day's work." Two corrective measures were taken. A period of "experimentation" with varying workloads "to be done before a given deadline" was begun, which finally pegged the workload at approximately

600 copies per day.³ To encourage achievement of this "optimum capacity," in addition, work flow was controlled by batching orders twice daily for the pullers, an entire batch to be passed on from the Copy Pulling Section to the mailing station at one time.

The O & M Approach: Its Underlying Theory

Prescriptions for change must be based upon a working theory of what leads to what. Though it is largely implicit, the working theory underlying the O & M application includes four major propositions:

1. that "authority" flows from above (the work-process changes were instituted unilaterally);
2. that this authority must be enforced by close supervision (the new supervisors had a small span of control);
3. that, for purposes of the job, the individual is essentially a physiological organism (an even "rhythm" was emphasized and individuals were isolated from their fellows); and
4. that specialization and routinization increase productivity (some kinds of tasks formerly handled by each copy puller were eliminated and his work-area was limited).

These conditions were assumed to be a necessary and sufficient foundation to the achievement of high productivity.

After the brief resistance to raising productivity, the reorganization and its underlying theory seemed to have accomplished the intended job. By mid-1946, processing time for an order had been reduced to about three days (as opposed to three months) and unit costs were substantially lower. Despite a 20 per cent increase in volume, employees were cut from fifty-four to forty-four in the first half of 1946.⁴

But the success was not as final as it appeared. In 1948, a second reorganization was required to meet problems which small-group theory could have foreseen earlier.

The Small-Group Approach

The small-group analyst could have helped solve both the short-run and long-run problems mentioned above. Basically, his contri-

³ According to the Budget Bureau report. The case study says that 800 or 900 was found to be a reasonable load. No available records settle the disagreement.

⁴ Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

² Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

bution rests upon three major insights into the group process.

First, small-group analysts would observe that the Copy Pulling Section prior to the reorganization was characterized by low structural and style integration. That is, informal groups within the section had their own leaders and their own goals, quite apart from those of the formal organization. Because the head of the Copy Sales Branch was heavily burdened, its constituent units "enjoyed considerable autonomy except when a crisis arose." Moreover, the group maintained a "norm" (a rule of behavior acceptable to the group) limiting output to 300 copies per day. This sharply reflects differences in formal organization goals and informal group goals. Low morale due to poor opportunities for promotion, undesirable working conditions and physical surroundings, and a generally inadequate personnel policy supported these differences.⁵

One obvious approach to increased productivity was to try to remedy this low integration without causing other problems, i.e., to encourage the copy pullers to shift their goals toward high production. The reorganization aimed at this through much closer supervision of copy pullers and tight schedules of work. But the O & M applications neglected the side-effects of this approach.

Second, the small-group analyst would observe the high "cohesiveness" of the informal groups, demonstrated (for example) in the resistance early in the reorganization to increased production by the Copy Pulling Section. "Cohesiveness" is a measure of the attraction a group has for its members, and thus of the control which a group exercises over the behavior of its members.

The reorganization might have been aimed at using the control over member behavior that is implicit in high cohesiveness to increase structural and style integration and so productivity. But the O & M application first overlooked, then sharply reduced, cohesiveness in the section. Without cohesiveness, there were no socially-enforced norms to compete with organization goals, so we can say that temporarily structural and style integration increased. The agency, however, did not win the support that a group with high cohesiveness could have given to its goals.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

Third, the small-group analyst also would have observed the change in leadership style and in the resulting group atmosphere that the reorganization intended. Briefly, a "permissive" leadership style and atmosphere characterized the informal groups before reorganization. The reorganization imposed a "directive" leadership style and atmosphere. The difference between the two styles of leadership may be suggested tersely:

Directive Style	Permissive Style
1. close supervision	1. general supervision
2. choice by supervisor in such matters as work assignment and output goals	2. self-choice, or participation in choice, by group members in such matters as work assignments and output goals

The reorganization might have been based on a leadership style and group atmosphere which would aid (rather than hinder) the attempt to employ the high cohesiveness of informal groups to develop a lasting increase in support of formal organization leaders and goals. In contrast, however, the choice of a directive style had the short-run consequence of encouraging resistance to change and the long-run consequence of building compliance on shaky foundations.

Defects of the O & M Approach

The O & M theory did not encompass the possibility of tapping the potential power of cohesive informal groups to build support for organization goals and guide worker action to those goals. The effects of the reorganization indicated that some important factors pertaining to behavior in small groups had been neglected. Consequently, some negative side-effects of the reorganization were not expected. Moreover, other effects were predicted but for the wrong or inadequate reasons.

The "norm" respected by the copy pullers before reorganization typifies the behavioral factors which were neglected by the O & M theory. Their neglect had an important consequence. For, unexpectedly, the early operation of the reorganized system in the Copy Pulling Section was hamstrung by the 300-copy limit on production. Though the physical effort of pulling copies was clearly cut, the production remained the same. This norm

was a social product, unaffected by changes in the work process.

The neglect of norms also closed what might have been a useful avenue of productivity increase without any change in work process. Raising of norms has been achieved through "group decision-making" by the employees, directed by a trainer. The technique supports change without shifting control of the individual from the group to the formal organization. It is self-regulation, which the O & M approach did not provide. Group decision-making has pushed production quotas even above time-and-motion analysis standards on some jobs. Such increases are not mystical. Time-and-motion analysis encourages worker resistance short of the physical capacity of a job set-up. Group decision-making tends to reduce this resistance, for the decision becomes that of the participants rather than of a remote formal authority. A productivity increase often results from this involvement.⁶

The O & M theory also predicted some of the results of the reorganization, but for the wrong or inadequate reasons. A brief analysis of cohesiveness and group atmosphere demonstrates the point.

Given the failure to attempt to use the

* Two points should be made clear. First, the emphasis here is upon outlining an alternative to the approach to change dictated by the O & M theory. Indeed, three alternative changes are presented in this paper. Two have been mentioned. The persevering reader will find a third detailed in the discussion of the 1948 reorganization below. Each was capable of inducing increased productivity, at least temporarily. But each had different empirical and normative costs.

Second, the analysis does not presume to dictate what should have been done in the reorganization. And certainly this is not a plea for "completely democratized administration," whatever that means. There is substantial reason to believe, however, that some degree of employee participation or self-choice would have made the productivity increase more palatable in this case. The autonomy of the section which developed before the reorganization, for example, supports this view.

The effects of varying degrees of employee participation in attempts to increase productivity are strikingly demonstrated in an experiment which compared total participation of work units in productivity plans, participation of workers through representatives, and simple management directives. Participation was most successful and management directives least successful. See Lester Coch and John R. P. French, Jr., "Overcoming Resistance to Change," *Human Relations* 5:12-32 (No. 1, 1948).

original high cohesiveness to support the reorganization, cohesiveness had to be reduced to permit a productivity increase. For as long as cohesiveness was high and no effort was made to turn group goals toward organization goals, group members would support the 300-copy norm. The weakening of cohesiveness was accomplished, though this apparently was not part of the O & M strategy. Fear of losing their jobs successfully competed with the attraction to employees of informal-group membership, one can infer. This fear doubtless was stimulated by the "experimentation" used to set work standards, the firm work schedule, and the new supervisors with limited spans of control. A workforce cut of 20 per cent had a similar effect. Since many of the copy pullers were elderly, long-service employees, they were particularly susceptible to such an approach. In addition, the limited skill employed in copy pulling enhanced the power of numerical work standards and stimulated a competitiveness which is the very opposite of high group cohesiveness.

Cohesiveness probably was further weakened and fear heightened by the release of the informal-group leaders who had been most active in enforcing group norms. This is a surmise, although it is supported by the recollections of individuals still in the Patent Office. The surmise assumes that: group leaders were the last to give up the low-production norm; and dismissal, like promotion, was governed wholly by production records. The research literature provides some support. There is a direct relationship between group status and conformity to norms when: (1) the situation is visible to all; (2) the individual feels insecure in his status; and (3) the individual highly values his status.⁷ These conditions seem to have existed in the Copy Pulling Section. Thus high status in the group would be associated with rigid norm observance and with resistance to increased production. Informal leaders, then, would be the more obvious prospects for release. Such releases would encourage the breakdown of the 300-copy norm, but the costs include social dislocation and the loss of individuals who had displayed leadership talent.

⁷ James E. Dittes and Harold H. Kelley, "Effects of Different Conditions of Acceptance Upon Conformity to Group Norms," 53 *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 100-7 (July, 1956).

Changes in group atmosphere similarly encouraged an output increase. But the O & M theory did not explain these changes adequately. Nor did it predict some less desired long-run consequences of the changes in atmosphere and in the supervisory style upon which it depends.

Existing studies reveal that, in general, persons tend to resist a formal supervisor who attempts to assume all leadership functions. And even when the supervisor successfully pushes the group toward agency goals, the group tends to engage in non-task behavior and to disintegrate as a functioning unit when (for example) the supervisor is absent. The point is crucial, for constant formal supervision is difficult even when tasks require little skill and little mobility.

Why, then, did productivity increase in the Section? A directive atmosphere may induce high output *under certain conditions*. For example, one plant studied used a directive supervisory style to attain high production levels despite a size disadvantage and difficult working conditions.⁸ The "certain conditions": many of the employees were transients or had limited employability because of physical deformities, for example. A similar set of "certain conditions"—employee age, fear of release—seem to have existed in the Copy Pulling Section.

Consistently, studies of groups have demonstrated that most individuals have wide "response repertoires," that is, they are able to adjust their behavior in the short run to a wide range of atmospheres. But they do prefer some atmospheres over others, and reaction against less-liked job relations is always possible. The early resistance to the reorganization by the copy pullers was such a reaction. Longer-run difficulties in the Section similarly reflected resistance to an undesired leadership style and group atmosphere.

Short-run conditions, moreover, were very favorable for a directive atmosphere in the Section. The task of copy pulling loses less due to competitiveness than many jobs. Little interpersonal cooperation is involved in the performance of the task, and each task is much like the one before. Performance of

such work will be affected less by the socio-emotional disturbances which a directive atmosphere encourages.⁹ (A permissive atmosphere, in contrast, will show to better advantage on jobs requiring a high degree of cooperation and innovation.)

The new supervisors, in addition, seem to have been well-suited for employing a directive style. The high productivity records of the new supervisors—made while most Section members respected the 300-copy norm—stamped them as deviants from group opinion and, most probably, from the permissive atmosphere in which the 300-copy norm developed.

Despite the conditions favoring a fear-supported directive style and despite the productivity increase, the small-group analyst would expect the change in group atmosphere to result in long-run disturbances. The supervisors were not the persons the copy pullers would have chosen. Indeed, they were almost certainly not socially acceptable to group members. It is unlikely, short of a major change in behavior, that the new supervisors would be able to add leadership skills to the authority and power given by the formal organization.¹⁰ Moreover, there is no evidence that assignments to the reorganized segments of the files had any basis other than administrative convenience.

The situation was loaded for ineffectiveness and conflict. To illustrate, available studies show that, comparing self-choice or some degree of participation in choice of assignments or of leaders with imposition from

⁸Deutsch's laboratory study of "cooperation" and "competition," for example, predicted that "competitive" groups would be less efficient than "cooperative" groups. But the prediction was supported only for discussion of a human relations problem. For a puzzle problem, in contrast, no significant differences existed between the two conditions. Deutsch concluded that the puzzle task required so little cooperation and had such obvious solutions that problem "blocking" was difficult even in the competitive condition. Morton Deutsch, "The Effects of Cooperation and Competition upon Group Process," in Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (eds.), *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory* (Row, Peterson & Co., 1953), pp. 319-53.

Some individuals, however, would react differently. Thus precise prediction would require specification of personality factors.

¹⁰For a sketch of the "rate buster" as a social isolate, see Melville Dalton, "The Industrial 'Rate-Buster': A Characterization," *7 Applied Anthropology* 5-8 (Winter, 1948).

⁹William J. Goode and Irving Fowler, "Incentive Factors in a Low Morale Plant," *4 American Sociological Review* 618-24 (October, 1949).

above, the former achieve higher productivity.¹¹ Self-choice also tends to induce group "compatibility." ("Compatibility" refers to a low-conflict combination of personality characteristics.) The emotional friction caused by low compatibility can have serious effects on productivity. As one student noted,

... the dominant reason for a group's productivity depends on the extent to which members can get along together—their "compatibility." The more energy a group expends on interpersonal problems arising from lack of compatibility the less energy they devote to the task at hand. Further, the conversion of interpersonal hostility into obstructive task behavior, as in unreasonable criticism, is a subtle and amazingly large source of nonproductivity.¹²

Compatibility will most influence the performance of work which requires substantial cooperation and which is not repetitive. But few jobs could escape negative effects over the long run. Of course, a cohesive and compatible group is also more able to resist going in the direction set for the organization.

These potential difficulties in the Copy Pulling Section were heightened by contrast to the previous work process. Before the reorganization, copy pullers controlled their jobs to a substantial degree. Each sorted his own orders, providing an opportunity to vary his job. Moreover, a puller might arrange a satisfactory itinerary through the files and work pretty much at his own pace. The reorganization sheared the task of such features.

The change of job content, then, implied significant risks. These risks might have been worth running if narrowing the job were the only path to increased productivity, but in fact the opposite—job enlargement—often has very favorable effects on productivity.¹³ Be-

yond some imprecisely known point, specialization decreases rather than increasing efficiency. Apparently that point is commonly passed in low-level industrial and administrative situations.

Even if one looks only at the results rather than at the O & M theory, the results are mixed at best. On the positive side, the initial opposition to the reorganization was overcome. Deliberately or inadvertently, group cohesiveness was assailed, possible leadership talent pushed aside, and group compatibility attacked. This approach had the effect of raising output in the short run.

The situation, however, was a touchy one. Recalcitrant copy pullers were coerced into higher production by supervisors who were not liked and who used a style of leadership unacceptable (on all evidence) to the copy pullers. Meanwhile, copy pulling had been stripped of what little variety, planning, self-direction, and sociability it once had. Clearly, this created an emotional situation which could not sustain high productivity without difficulty.

For a time—under threat by management and a weakening of informal-group ties—output was sustained. But significant forces soon developed in a contrary direction. When the "heat was off," it seems to have been the case that new informal groups developed whose leaders were not the formal supervisors and whose goals did not coincide with those of the formal organization. In brief, structural and style integration fell. A second reorganization of the Copy Pulling Section followed.

The Second Reorganization

This picture of the first reorganization could not be documented in all particulars, but the nature of the 1948 reorganization supports the analysis. The 1948 reorganization turned back to 1945 in a number of significant respects.

1. First-line supervisors' span of control was sharply increased, making detailed supervision of copy pullers far more difficult.
2. Jobs were enlarged: pullers performed a "fine sort" and often were assigned tasks other than pulling.
3. Opportunities for on-the-job training and advancement were increased.
4. Two channels of work flow, based on source

¹¹ Raymond H. Van Zelst, "Validation of a Sociometric Regrouping Procedure," 47 *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 299-301 (April, 1952).

Similarly, acceptance of formally-appointed supervisors is strongly associated with high production. Self-choice or participation, of course, are techniques for encouraging acceptance. Relevantly, see Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, "Leadership Practices in Relation to Productivity and Morale," in Cartwright and Zander, *op. cit.*, pp. 612-27.

¹² William C. Schutz, "What Makes Groups Productive?" 8 *Human Relations* 429-66 (November, 1955).

¹³ See the summary of research in Chris Argyris, *Personality and Organization* (Harper and Brothers, 1957), pp. 177-87.

of orders, were set up: mail orders and "window" (local) orders.

5. Only one daily batch of orders was scheduled for mail orders, allowing the puller more discretion in timing.

6. Although work standards were developed for mail orders, rotation and training plus the pressure of orders not conveniently assignable to areas of the files limit their applicability. Enforcement of standards also seems flexible.

7. There are no work standards for "window" orders except daily demand, which is well within the capacities of the pullers.

8. Pullers have some influence in assignments.

9. Supervision has been loosened, in part because the span of control of first-line supervisors was sharply extended.

10. Despite the loosening of supervision, the supervisors have added power because they select employees for job rotation and training.

But the 1948 reorganization also suggests that a lesson had been learned from the earlier reorganization. Many of the 1948 changes, in sum, had the effect of removing blocks in the way of individual attachment to the formal organization. In addition, a policy of rapid promotion plus a high quit-rate complemented this undercutting of any informal group opposed to the formal organization. High turnover has undesirable aspects, but it does provide a social escape valve which reduces the strength of informal groups in resisting organization policies. Rapid promotion, complementarily, gives the more ambitious and capable a reason for supporting the formal organization. Previously, they had to be content with mobilizing resistance to the formal organization, for promotion possibilities were few before the 1946 reorganization and informal leaders seem to have been neglected in the post-reorganization promotions.

Although not as tidy as the 1945-46 arrangement, the 1948 organization is quite satisfactory. It is still in effect. And although the total number of copies pulled has increased approximately 40 per cent during 1946-59, the workforce has increased but 10 per cent.

A Question of Values

Even had the O & M goal of increased economy and efficiency been attained by the 1946 reorganization, this would not

establish that the reorganization was "good." Increased productivity might have been achieved without reorganization simply through group decision-making. Adverse effects accompanying reorganizations are minimized by this approach, although the technique usually is applied with the understanding that all participants would be retained in some capacity even if greater efficiency decreases the number of jobs. This is usually not difficult, especially when (as in the Patent Office) new job opportunities are opening and turnover is quite high. Or the pattern of the 1948 reorganization might have been followed in the first place. It orients copy pullers in support of the formal organization and pays the price of control in high turnover and perhaps in the loss of the task motivation which a cohesive group can induce. But this approach avoids the development of a highly cohesive group which could resist the formal organization. And it avoids the stark deprivation of any initiative and variety of the 1946 reorganization.

The choice, then, is between alternative techniques of increasing production. In part, the choice will be based on empirical data. Thus an as-yet unperformed experiment would have to determine whether the approach of the 1948 reorganization, as compared to a conscious attempt to build and utilize group cohesiveness, involves any substantial losses in productivity, turnover, absenteeism, employee tension and the like.

The choice also poses a question of values. Specifically, how far can specialization go before it dehumanizes? O & M theory does not explicitly recognize any value limits. Thus, as part of the earlier reorganization, various high-threat techniques reduced the copy puller's control over his job; he was assigned to one area of the files; a work schedule set his pace; he was closely supervised; and he lost opportunities to diversify his work.

Indeed, the O & M concern was for a steady, machine-like "rhythm" of work flow. This concern has gone overly far at times.¹⁴ If only

¹⁴ We might reason backwards that if morons are better at a job than persons of average intelligence, it is not a very suitable job for the average person. The report of an electronics plant manager about the work of morons in his factory would then be relevant: "In every case, these girls proved to be exceptionally

for this reason, the limits that values imply cannot go unrecognized.

well-behaved, particularly obedient, and strictly honest and trustworthy. They carried out work required of them to such a degree of efficiency that we were surprised they were classed as subnormals for their age. Their attendance was good, and their behavior was, if anything, certainly better than any other employee of the same age." Quoted with permission from *The Making of a Moron*, p. 16, by Niall Brennan, Copyright 1953 by Sheed and Ward, Inc., New York. (His and my emphases.) The performance of "normal" individuals was potty.

Summary

It seems clear that there now is sufficient theory about small-group behavior to begin to apply it tentatively in O & M work, at least to avoid such gross pitfalls as seemed to trip up the Patent Office reorganizers. But as we learn more about administrative behavior, the question of values inherent in our organization theory becomes even more clamorous—for the more we know, the more alternative paths we shall be able to find to the goals of efficiency and economy. The question of choice of values, then, cannot be submerged.

Democracy and the Bureaucracy

. . . My contention is that the really important decisions made within the government are taken by a relatively small group of men: the President and his closest advisers; the leaders of Congress, particularly the Senate; and the administrators directly interested in the decision to be made. This can, I think, be called decision-making by a high-level committee with a shifting membership. . . . To some extent, this group has been given a legal basis in the creation of the National Security Council. . . . This emphatically does not mean that the group of men can, or does, act without regard for the demands of the people generally. These decision-makers take into account not only what in fact the "people" generally are demanding but also what, in their judgment, the "people" will go along with. . . . Furthermore, as de Tocqueville observed, "when the central government . . . has issued a decree, it must entrust the execution of its will to agents over whom it frequently has no control and whom it cannot perpetually direct." . . .

The role of the bureaucracy is to see that the basic ground rules established by Congress are obeyed. This is carried out by applying the general rules to an infinitely detailed number of particular instances. Another primary function of the bureaucracy is to represent the unofficial groups, whose activities they are set up to regulate, in the governmental decision-making process. This does not mean, as is often averred, that a regulatory commission necessarily becomes the captive of the activity it regulates, but it does mean that the regulators tend to espouse the cause of the regulated when conflicts with other group interests arise. Finally, in conjunction with the executive, the bureaucracy exists to further the public, as distinguished from group, interest—the interests of all of the people of the nation. Whether it does or not is the subject of much controversy.

—ARTHUR S. MILLER, "Private Governments and the Constitution," Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1959.

Soviet Tractor Stations— Policy Control by Auxiliary Services

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AUXILIARY services providing specialized assistance to the line units in such fields as typing, printing, purchasing, or public relations have a clear place in American public administration theory. On the whole, auxiliary service units are to serve the line almost as though they were outside agencies hired to do it. In practice, however, American administrators are sharply aware of the power of auxiliary services to control the timing of programs and often to modify the method, with the result, at least occasionally, that program content also is modified. The central purchasing office, set up to save the line agency trouble and provide expertness in seeking out the best product at the lowest price, the personnel office, established to save the line agency trouble and provide professional advice on recruiting or training, in practice often control how to purchase or how to recruit and train, and this control can produce a strong effect on program content.

The Soviet Machine Tractor Station, famed not only as a system for channeling scarce and expensive capital equipment for greatest output but even more as the eyes and ears of the central government in the field(s), should not,

NOTE: The present paper is drawn largely from a monograph recently published by the University of Kansas Governmental Research Center: Roy D. Laird, Darwin E. Sharp, and Ruth Sturtevant, *The Rise and Fall of the MTS As An Instrument of Soviet Rule*, 1960.

Among the many pathways of comparative research in administration perhaps the most immediately fruitful is the investigation of how other cultures try to solve the problems of public management that we find persistent. New ideas can be expected even on questions we have examined for a long time because experience within another culture often starts at a different point and so builds differently. Also, if we look at these problems in a new stage setting, their elements often are stripped of peripheral concerns. Fundamental properties of organizations are more clearly defined.

Here, two such persistent problems are examined in their Soviet context: the proper allocation of power between auxiliary staffs and line administrators and arrangements of forces within an organization that assist in maintaining control at the center.

then, seem strange or unrelated to American public administration. Further, this is a study in a dilemma of control, whether by staff or line: how to keep the controller distant enough from the group he controls so he does not identify with it and yet close enough so his decisions are reasonable. (Organizing budget examiners involves this same dilemma, for example.)

Origin of the MTS

In the late 1920's, the newly enthroned Stalinists created machine-tractor stations in an attempt to improve the efficiency of agriculture, an industry woefully short of machinery. The stations early demonstrated the advantages attributed to auxiliary services: 1.

Grouping this "common activity" was generally conceded to have assured more efficiency than alternative systems. 2. Experts were made available to line officials—in this case the *kolkhozy* (collective farm leaders). 3. Closer supervision of the service was facilitated. 4. Scarce resources (farm machinery) were rationed with a national view.

Much more important, the stations became a policy arm of the central government. In peasant Russia, agriculture was the major source of investment capital with which to broaden the industrial base, but the semi-independent system of peasant farming did not allow for efficient and speedy extraction of enough of the peasants' products. To maximize production with minimum input and, equally important, to achieve the dictates of Marxian doctrine that agriculture be socialized, Stalin had to mold the individual activities of 120 million farm people, 80 per cent of the total population.

The number of machine-tractor stations grew rapidly after the "ten tractor" *Schvchenko* station started in 1927. For the first few years the stations were technically owned by the collectives. In 1931, when they were taken over by the national Soviet government,¹ there were 1,131 stations. By 1957, a year before their abolition, there were more than 8,000. A statement made in 1954 (the best information available) set the number of permanent employees for all stations at more than 1,250,000, and virtually all of the cropped land was serviced by them.

Lines of Authority from the Government

Formal and clear lines of authority are regarded as one of the cornerstones of administrative efficiency in the Western world. Even in recent studies where the existence of informal lines and the impossibility of clearly separating line and staff are recognized, there is an implicit understanding that multiple lines should not be created deliberately.² At the risk of oversimplification, there is still

¹ The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics is a federal type of government under a constitution allocating powers also to republics (comparable to our states) and to smaller districts. See organization chart following.

² For example, see the discussion of dual supervision by O. Glenn Stahl in his article, "The Network of Authority," 18 *Public Administration Review* II (Winter, 1958).

widespread acceptance of the concept that a formal military-type hierarchy is related to legal responsibility and in turn is necessary for democratic responsibility.

In contrast, Soviet authorities created in the MTS a system of *formal* multiple lines of authority. For them, "doubt" has been institutionalized and triple interwoven hierarchies have been regarded as an essential guarantee of conformity to the central will. A symbolic way of depicting the Soviet concept is the pyramid: one face represents the formal state organization, another the party, and the third the political police. Under this arrangement, politics and administration are joined and yet separated. This type of organization was not a happenstance creation which Soviet authorities would prefer to abolish.


The organization chart reveals some of the external relations of the stations, but it does not tell the whole story. Fundamentally, the stations were an extension of a department of the national government.³ As such, each MTS director was immediately responsible to the National Ministry of Agriculture, employed and dismissed by that agency. Of course, in routine matters regional offices of the ministry supervised the direction of affairs. As the administrative head and as a government official, the director was held primarily responsible for the fulfillment of the economic plans not only of his MTS but also of the collective farms it served.

Chief Agronomist

The chief agronomist of each MTS was a coordinate authority—and at the same time, along with his subordinates, an auxiliary service to the auxiliary service. He was responsible basically for the methods and techniques of field crop production and soil management. But what made his position unusual was his joint appointment and dismissal by heads of provincial agricultural administrations and by the ministries of agriculture of the republics. Also, although he could be compared to the agricultural extension worker in the United States who advises and counsels with farm producers, the chief agronomist according to a 1953 decree was a state inspector,

³ Although directly under the charge of the ministry of Agriculture other federal agencies such as the secret police, and particularly *gosplan* (the state planning agency) exercised considerable influence.

AGRICULTURAL ADMINISTRATION (as of 1956)



checking on the quality of collective farm work and empowered to issue orders correcting malpractice. His "instructions and orders . . . on problems of farming methods and quality of agricultural work must be carried out and can be countermanded only by province and territory agriculture and procurements administrations and by republic Ministries of Agriculture and Procurements."

Under each chief agronomist were field agronomists and zootechnicians. Soviet authorities, caught in the dilemma of distance vs. identification, vacillated about how close these field personnel should be to the MTS and kolkhozy. Prior to 1951 they were part of the staff of the MTS, but in that year they were advised to live on the kolkhozy. In 1953 they were transferred back to the MTS. Two years later they were placed on the kolkhoz again so they could more easily become a "part of the kolkhoz." There they became subject to a rather standard type of dual supervision, subordinated to the officials of the kolkhozy except "in questions of crop and livestock servicing of collective farms [when]

they are obligated to follow the instructions of the chief agronomists and chief zootechnicians."

Tractor Brigades

Actual tractor work on the collectives was handled by the tractor brigades (five to seven tractors) under the immediate command of the director. Members of the brigade were divided into three groups: (1) brigadiers (and their assistant and some "auxiliary inspectors") who were responsible for care and maintenance of equipment, (2) tractor drivers and other equipment operators, and (3) service squads (fuel carriers and providing other supplies). Prior to 1953, these workers were members of a kolkhoz and were temporarily attached to an MTS. Because of the large annual turnover stemming from this arrangement (estimated at 30 to 35 per cent), a 1953 order of the Party and government provided that "tractor drivers, . . . brigade leaders [and helpers] . . . excavator machinists [and helpers] and chief accountants are permanent [MTS] workers. . . ." The decree further

specified that seasonal workers were to be assigned to the stations during harvest and could not be assigned other work without the consent of the MTS. The tractor workers took less initiative to help the kolkhozy in unusual situations after they were assigned to the MTS permanently, and this motivation problem was never fully solved to the satisfaction of Soviet authorities.

Control by the Party

The stations, controllers of agricultural operations, are themselves held to central policy by the Party. A Party secretary, representing the local district government, is a "coordinate" to the director. A most graphic statement of his function is found in a resolution of the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee in 1933:

The political departments of the machine and tractor stations . . . must act as the eye of the party and must guarantee control in all fields of work and life on the machine and tractor stations . . . as well as on the collective farms served by the machine and tractor stations. Guaranteeing the quality of seed during the sowing season, preventing the theft of seed, supervising the correct execution of the threshing operation, combating misappropriations of threshed grain, fighting against absentees from work, guaranteeing proper care of the livestock and other property of the collective . . . farms, expelling all pernicious anti-Soviet and anti-collective-farm elements from the collective . . . farms, selecting the best tested cadres for the collective . . . farms—such and similar are the problems that must constitute the focal point of the work of the political departments.

Although the Party secretary in 1933 was formally a deputy director of the MTS, further provisions of the same resolution explicitly stated (seemingly in contradiction to the above) that the political departments within the MTS were to supersede neither the directors nor the local district Party committees. The basic relationship between the Party and MTS was to be governed by the principle of one-man management, but the political departments (the full-time deputy party director and any other party members primarily engaged in production work) were to "aid in the solution of the tasks confronting the directors and were to supply the district committees with periodic information about the work of the stations." The Party spokesman

also was to "explain to every mechanizer the nature and import of the Party and government directives." These Party functions remained throughout the years, although the formal relationship of the Party representative was changed when the position of deputy director was abolished and a party secretary established as a "co-equal" with the director in 1953.

Party influence on administration is not alien to American administrators. The political party is expected to have an interest in and be responsible for administrative policy. But the party has no formal role in American administration as the Communist Party does in the MTS, and the roles that are played are almost opposite. In the United States, administrators are held responsible through successive higher supervisors, culminating in responsibility to an elected official. While this system possesses unquestioned advantages, control of lower levels of the bureaucracy is never perfect and repair of mistakes of policy or procedure usually tardy. In the Soviet Union, the Party is authorized to inspect and intervene at the lowest administrative level, and it places spokesmen in official posts of units of government such as the MTS.

In a Western democracy it is the minority political party that checks on administrative practices, which, at least theoretically, are the responsibility of their rivals. In Russia, the single Party is formally the "loyal opposition" to the administrators, and the secret police checks on both groups.

It seems likely, also, that the Party provides administrative uniformity in this activity, split as the responsibility is between the national government (which appoints station directors) and the republics (which name chief agronomists). Of course, the need for coordination under the Soviet system, where federalism is meaningless, is less than would be true in the United States.

Separatism and Centralization

The advantages of separating this auxiliary service from line control must be matched by the confusion that sometimes resulted. The system apparently never was formally challenged, though contradictions were observed. For example, when a spring snow surprised one MTS, its leaders refused to switch from tractor plowing equipment to snowplows so

the collective could ship its meat quota to market. The MTS already had fulfilled its quota of work and did not need to do any more. One writer complained:

Just think how many contradictions there are in our life. Just take this dispute with the collective farm chairman about clearing the roads. It seems like a triviality, a misunderstanding. But you try to solve it! For some time now the collective farms have been granted the power to plan their own work and use their own initiative. But what kind of initiative is there here! The plans for tractor work, on which the whole prosperity of the collective farm depends, continue to be handed down from above by the province agricultural administration, and usually these plans exceed the needs. What does the MTS do? In pursuit of formal fulfillment of the plan in conditional hectares of soft plowing, it naturally begins to look for work that is "advantageous" of itself, large-scale work with a high coefficient, such as cultivation of fallow land, although often this endless cultivation—why hide our sins?—only harms matters; while the MTS avoids such "trivial," "unprofitable" work as clearing the roads, even though it may be crucial to production . . .

There also were signs of overcontrol from the central government which was a growing problem as tractor stations increased in number and size and the potential for central control was fully recognized.

Until modest reforms were adopted in 1955, not only the total volume of tractor work but much of the detail work assigned to each MTS and the production of each collective were centrally planned. As Khrushchev himself admitted, this kind of planning was devised ". . . without any consideration for [local] soil or climatic conditions and failed to develop the initiative and creativity of the MTS workers, agricultural specialists, collective farm leaders and the whole mass of collective farmers." Attempts to allocate machinery on a national scale also resulted in "gross and numerous mistakes," according to one report in 1954. In 1956 Khrushchev stated that a system must be established so that machines are sent to the stations only on the application of the directors, and in 1957 he complained about the opposite problem—that farmers planned for tractors without reference to MTS resources. Finally, in 1958 the Soviet press described still a third problem, though related to the first one:

Certain machines were allowed to pass into serial [mass] production with serious construction defects and, arriving at the MTS and sovkhozy, proved unfit for work. The leaders of the ministry cannot be ignorant of the idle time and the damage of hundreds of valuable machines, unused for years in Kalinin and other provinces.

Though the stations were assigned to coordinate agricultural activity, they themselves often were uncoordinated. Even Party controls were not always effective. As early as 1934, standard contracts between the stations and kolkhozy were decreed. (This standard contract also served to increase MTS control over the kolkhozy.) In 1939, even stricter controls were necessary. "The new contract differed from its predecessor in laying down more rigid rules and enforcing a greater degree of responsibility on both parties in the punctual and accurate performance of their respective obligations. This same problem of coordination appeared with regard to the use and distribution of spare parts, the situation being so bad that tractor stoppages, as a result of technical disrepair, exceeded 4,000,000 tractor hours in one province." Of particular significance in revealing administrative problems was the attempt to introduce cost accounting in 1956 due to "the negligent attitude of the directors of some MTS toward financial and economic aspects of MTS work, toward rational utilization of collective farm land and toward operating economically." Stated differently by Khrushchev before the twentieth Party Congress:

The presently existing order of financing MTS through the state budget begets irresponsibility and lack of control. Many workers of the MTS do not study deeply the economic indices of the work of the machine-tractor stations and do not display proper interest in the rational use of machines. MTS are financed independently from the results of [their] economic achievement; payment for the labor of MTS workers is not dependent on the effective use of machines [or] on the yield of agricultural products and the productiveness of animal-husbandry on the kolkhozy.

Whether these and other problems arose because the organization was too large and too centralized or because of poor personnel, one cannot say at this distance. There is some evidence that at least three factors were responsible: (1) shortage of trained personnel

at the local level to report rapidly and accurately, (2) conscious desire by the national authorities to maintain control over kolkhozy even at the price of poor allocation of resources, and (3) some friction between the kolkhozy and tractor stations. Perhaps the inefficiency was simply a predictable result of the Soviet Union's effort—parallel to our own at that time—to work out a suitable large-scale organization for new nationwide social programs.

The End of the MTS

Quite abruptly in 1958 Khrushchev suggested the sale of all MTS equipment to the kolkhozy, a startling proposal that would result in a basic change in economic relationships. Plowing and sowing of grain crops, cotton, sugar beets, and certain other crops on the kolkhozy were almost completely mechanized at this time through MTS. Moreover, the MTS administrative device was nearly thirty years old, and even in an authoritarian setting the "way it has always been done" cannot be brushed aside.

Several factors explain the radical change. It ended the national subsidy to the collectives through central financing of the MTS and cut down the central government's share of what apparently had been an overinvestment in agriculture since Stalin's death; after all, every added ruble invested in agriculture would be a ruble less for industrial expansion. Even more interesting is the real possibility that public opinion was a major consideration in this affair, ruling out a direct removal of the MTS subsidy. On the other side, the MTS monopoly over collective farms was no longer necessary. Other controls had been developed. For example, after 1950, a redoubled effort was made to choose party members as kolkhozy chairmen (the chief administrative officers); by 1957, 90 per cent were Communists. Also, the total number of Communists in the kolkhozy increased substantially—by nearly 200,000 from 1954 to 1958, according to Khrushchev—and the number of farms were decreased by amalgamation so that indoctrinated agricultural technicians and administrative and mechanical specialists were present on nearly every farm. Finally, by 1958 there was no longer an acute shortage of agricultural equipment as there had been when the stations were first created, so that central allocation of scarce resources was not important. There was an indication that central coordination was not too successful in any case.

In short, Khrushchev concluded that efficiency now was on the side of decentralized auxiliary services and control was not a sufficiently valuable by-product to purchase with higher costs. It is also possible that the centralized power of MTS had grown to be a threat, and decentralization would have the effect of diminishing a state organization and at the same time increasing the role of the Party. Under this arrangement, there would be no loss of effective control and one could argue that the state was withering away, though the Party, of course, was not. This withering away of the state has been mentioned by the Soviets increasingly in recent months.

Conclusion

Though the authoritarian base of Soviet government keeps MTS experience from being directly applicable to Western systems, the way that auxiliary services fit into the governmental framework, the role the service performed, and the kind of problems its organization created are familiar to democratic nations and can be related to their experience. What was different was the frank use of an auxiliary agency for control not simply of the expert technicians with which the agency principally dealt but of the whole line operation—as though General Services Administration were to go beyond assuring efficient and honest procurement for line agencies and controlled the flow of goods to assure line agency conformance to, say, a Budget Bureau policy. Nevertheless, we can look perhaps with admiration at the abrupt ending of a massive auxiliary service which seemed no longer suited to administrative needs.

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Reviews of Books and Documents

Realities of Regulation

By VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, Northwestern University

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, by Kenneth Culp Davis. West Publishing Company, 1958. 4 volumes. Pp. 2555. \$70.00.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, by Kenneth Culp Davis. West Publishing Company, 1959. Pp. 617. \$8.00.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENT, by Kenneth Culp Davis. West Publishing Company, 1960. Pp. 547. \$6.00.

COMMENTING five years ago on relations between public administrators and lawyers, Dwight Waldo wrote in *The Study of Public Administration*, "there are still strained relations stemming from an early attempt of public administration to assert a management point of view as against the traditional approach of legal rights, duties, and procedures; and from what students of administration are prone to regard as an offensive combination of aridity and arrogance in lawyers' approach to administration."

If vestiges of the strained relations remain, the reasons might well be that bona fide differences in approach to the administrative process have been distorted into egregious stereotypes and that able representatives of both fields have confused writers to a particular discipline with spokesmen for it.

Kenneth Culp Davis teaches and writes to students and lawyers. With precision, clarity, and attention to comprehensive detail, he probes the universe of administrative law as he sees it and as he believes lawyers, law students, and undergraduates interested in administrative law ought to see it. The problems he defines and subject areas he covers in his *Treatise* (for lawyers), *Text* (for law students) and *Administrative Law and Government* (for undergraduates) represent key segments of the administrative process. They

are not the totality of the process, however. It would be a disservice both to Professor Davis and to the organized bar to suggest that either his approach or his characterization of "Mr. Practitioner" represents the lawyers' position.

In practice, "the lawyers' position" is in flux. Changes in the Supreme Court's general conceptions and evaluations of the administrative process from the hostility of the Court in the early 1930's to its enthusiastic support of administrative discretion in the 1950's have compelled practicing lawyers to concern themselves with facets of the process deemed alien or irrelevant in an earlier era. Changes in the political direction and control of the process also may have played their part in affecting some lawyers' attitudes. "Whose ox is being gored?" is no doubt as significant in delineating lawyers' ideologies as it is in conditioning attitudes of other groups in our society.

Professor Davis' three books are really part of a single, integrated venture. The *Treatise* is a remarkable compilation, analysis, and evaluation of court cases dealing with administrative agency practices and procedures, but it has other distinctions as well. In four volumes and more than 2,500 pages, Davis traces the development of the administrative process as a means of formulating rules and adjudicating disputes. He discusses the nature and legal validity of the comprehensive range of agency practices—investigating, supervising, prosecuting, advising, declaring, making rules, informally adjudicating, formally adjudicating and subdelegating power. He probes the role of hearing examiners and lays out the pros and cons of the "institutional decision." He carries out the most definitive examination yet recorded of the relationship to administrative law of legal concepts like official notice, estoppel, *stare decisis*, *res judicata*, pri-

mary jurisdiction, exhaustion of remedy, and ripeness for review. He investigates the subject of tort liability of governmental units and officials. He discusses federal and state forms of proceedings for review, and observes, records, and offers suggestions about the nature, scope, and consistency of judicial review of administrative action. He presents the actual forms most frequently used by practitioners before the CAB, FCC, FPC, FTC, ICC and NLRB, in addition to the forms relating to judicial review of administrative action in federal district and circuit courts. And he lists a valuable table of cases, which alone runs 131 pages, a complete table of statutes and regulations, and a table of authorities selected by the author for citation and discussion.

The *Text* is essentially a 600-page abridgment of the *Treatise*, and *Administrative Law and Government* an even more concise abridgment to 540 pages, and smaller pages than either *Treatise* or *Text*. A distinguishing feature of the undergraduate course book is its inclusion of 269 "problems" to stimulate discussion of facts and values. Chapter headings and much of the wording are identical in the three works.¹

More Law than Administration

Throughout these books, Professor Davis focuses attention on the delineation of legal principles rather than on processes of decision-making; and therein lies both asset and drawback. The asset is that the *Treatise* becomes the authoritative descriptive work on, as well as critique of, principles of administrative law. The drawback is that the volumes make little effort to meet the concerns of practicing lawyers, administrators, and students about how agencies reach decisions.

Davis views his task as the "systematic statement of principles" derived from "the huge mass of administrative law that has sprung up in recent decades." Asserting modestly that his *Treatise* can fulfill that task only partially, he explains that many principles cannot yet

be stated systematically because of conflicting or confusing authorities. "When the search for established principle turns out to be futile, the search must be for sound principle."

Thus, when he cannot extract guiding principles from established law, the author resorts to "whatever is of value in judicial opinions and other legal materials as a foundation for the creative construction of principles." Davis' analyses and creative constructions are made through intensive examination of limited data. Into his laboratory go, primarily, Supreme Court decisions and lower court opinions which pass upon agency rules, adjudications, and practices related to them. Since his data are legal, what comes out of his laboratory is a series of learned observations and incisive critiques on what courts have said and done about what agencies have said and done.

The Court's Part-Time Principles

To Davis, the principal source and maker of administrative law is the Supreme Court of the United States, and the principal method by which administrative law is made is the judicial focus on "particular problems as they arise in particular contexts, with the full benefit of the adversary system—briefs and arguments of counsel directed to crystallized, narrow issues." Seeking unity, clarity, and consistency in applicable principles, he is disturbed to find that the Supreme Court, despite the fact that it spends at least a third of its time reviewing administrative action, has failed to produce a coherent body of principles in many areas. Instead of clarifying, the Court often confuses; instead of unifying through the development of guiding principles, it often enhances conflict through contradictory holdings on the same basic issues; instead of adhering consistently to its declarations of policy, the Court pays lip service to many of its doctrines and then proceeds to announce decisions directly contrary to the doctrines while blandly continuing to assert the doctrines as though they were really law.

As but one of his many illustrations, Davis cites the Court's frequent references to the long-settled rule that no one can qualify for judicial relief for an injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. What the Supreme Court asserts as "an abiding and fundamental principle," Davis finds to have been explicitly violated in at

¹ Little more is said about *Administrative Law and Government*. The meticulous care and scholarship that distinguish the *Treatise* and *Text* are somewhat attenuated in the selection and abridgment of materials for the undergraduate course book, leaving the undergraduate to ponder over 269 significant problems with the limited aid of fragmented cases, discussions and comments.

least seven cases, two of which were almost identical cases only six months apart. Addressing himself to lawyers and judges, he then proposes two "guides" to decisions on this question: (1) Recognition that the Supreme Court's holdings not only do go both ways but probably should go both ways; (2) Avoidance of a "neat word formula," but utilization of three key factors to be weighed in determining whether a court should decide an issue of administrative jurisdiction without requiring exhaustion of administrative remedy: extent of injury likely from pursuit of administrative remedy, degree of apparent clarity or doubt about administrative jurisdiction, and significance of specialized administrative understanding.

Critique of the Supreme Court's Role

Many of his proposals, like the guide to decisions about exhaustion of administrative remedy, indicate that Davis does not argue with the Court over its exercise of eclecticism; but he objects to its misguided contention that a doctrine is being consistently applied and disagrees with many of its evaluations of the facts. He has no hesitation in pointing out the Court's "mistakes," its "improper" actions, and the principles on which the law of the future should be "reformed" or "firmly founded," as in his discussion of ripeness for review and of joinder of superior officers in suits naming subordinate officers as defendants.

Davis offers the Supreme Court five "constructive suggestions" to resolve the justices' confusions, illusions, and conflicting interpretations about administrative law: (1) write fewer general essays and give more meticulous care to the ones that are written; (2) take greater advantage of the values of case-to-case development of law; (3) make further effort to reduce the frequency of contradictory holdings and check the growing tendency to indulge in misleading hazy generalizations; (4) have greater respect for the Court's prior holdings and opinions; and (5) inquire whether there is too much indifference to the manipulation of technical doctrine in order to produce desired substantive results.

The role Davis appears to select for himself, in the end, is that of Polonius to the Supreme Court's Laertes. Will his suggestions experience a better fate? Davis supports his

position with convincing documentation, to say nothing of zeal. What he says merits consideration by judges, lawyers, teachers, legislators, and administrators. But what can any of us but the judges do once we've concurred in its pontifical wisdom? His advice is addressed to the judges. At the same time that he often disagrees with particular judgments he does not oppose retention of judicial discretion in reviewing legislative delegations of power and agency practices.

In essence, Davis' universe of administrative law is a judicially controlled universe; he views the administrative process almost exclusively from the vantage point of judge-declared norms and principles. Insofar as he deals with components other than the judiciary at all, he views them as subordinates within a hierarchical framework that has the judiciary at its apex. While encouraging the judges to recognize such truisms as that "Congress is closer than the Supreme Court to the practical limitations on the legislative process that compel or encourage resort to delegation," his appeal is always to the judiciary as ultimate lawmaker in a hierarchy rather than as coordinate lawmaker on an equal plane with Congress and the President. This view, with which many lawyers, political scientists, and administrators will disagree, emerges sharply in his chapters on the administrative process and institutional decisions.

Restricted View of Administrative Process

The chapter Davis calls "The Administrative Process" begins with a painstaking definition not of process but of "administrative law." This produces consequences of greater significance than mere semantic cavil, for it enables him to limit his discussion to a now minor part of the regulatory process.

He views administrative law as "the law concerning the powers and procedures of administrative agencies, including especially the law governing judicial review of administrative action." Specifically excluded from his definition is "the enormous mass of substantive law produced by the agencies." He rejects both the area covered by the definition of Landis in *The Administrative Process* ("The law the courts permitted [the agencies] to make was named 'administrative law.' . . .") and of Robson in his *Administrative Law in England* ("Administrative law should be re-

garded as the law relating to public administration, in the same way as commercial law consists of the law relating to commerce or land law the law relating to land."). The bulk of subjects related to civil service, budgetary planning, and administrative management are excluded. While acknowledging that judicial review of executive or administrative action that does not involve either adjudication or rule-making is part of administrative law, he contends that "the manner in which public officers handle business unrelated to adjudication or rule-making" is *not*, apart from judicial review, a part of administrative law.

This strange semantic dichotomy enhances his focus on the judiciary as lawmaker and reduces the need to study in depth any agency practices or procedures which do not bear the Davis stamp of "rule-making" or "adjudication." He admits that one consequence of his definition is "that much of what political scientists call 'public administration' is excluded." Davis does not discuss the possibility that he may also have excluded much of what the practicing lawyer considers administrative law, as well.

The "administrative process" is defined as "the complex of methods by which agencies carry out their tasks of adjudication, rule-making, and related functions." The "related functions" are the powers "incidental" to rule-making and adjudication—such as investigating, supervising, prosecuting, advising, and declaring. But what of these powers and the multidimensional, rational and irrational factors that enter into decision-making when they are not anchored to rule-making and adjudication? What of policy-making or policy-declaring processes such as preparation of agency memoranda, "handbooks" for employees, press releases, and speeches by agency officials? Surely, activities like these are as much a part of the administrative process as are agency actions and outputs formally inscribed with "rule-making" and "adjudication" on their file folders.

Nowadays, "Mr. Practitioner," the author's prototype of the practicing lawyer, is less likely to demonstrate the vapid, Babbitty attitudes toward administrative regulation that Davis attributes to him than an alert, if not sophisticated, concern with the multiple and complex methods and techniques of the administrative process that affect his own and

his clients' futures. If the members of the Administrative Law Section of the American Bar Association are at all typical of the practicing lawyer today, "Mr. Practitioner" wants to, because he needs to, keep abreast of all key manifestations of agency policy regardless of the labels they carry. Far from voting for a candidate who promises to abolish agencies as Davis' "Mr. Practitioner" does, he is likely to marvel at the candidate's naiveté and vote instead for the man who promises forums and studies, like the President's Conference on Administrative Procedure, to identify the major problems in the administrative process and to determine in what ways law can contribute to their resolution.

Narrow View of Institutional Decisions

As in the chapter on the administrative process, Davis' materials on institutional decisions show the brilliance and depth of his incisive, judicious temperament, but they are unduly confined in scope. He examines institutional decisions only within the context of the system of administrative adjudication. Far from being a proponent either of "judicialization" or of uncontrolled agency discretion, he examines with precision and balance what he designates as "the three major problems of the institutional decision": (1) the manner and extent of consideration of the evidence by deciding officers; (2) consultation of staff by examiners and by agency heads; and (3) absence of, or substitutions for, hearing officers and agency heads in hearings or agency decision sessions.

Vital to our understanding of the institutional decision as these three problems may be, many practicing lawyers would join students of public administration in wishing that the author had taken a broader view. The problems delineated by Davis are *rational* problems, and his discussion assumes that *rational* men are reaching *rational* decisions. But one major question of the institutional decision, which has broad consequences for lawyers, administrators, and scholars, is *whether* institutional decision-making is a rational process at all. The March and Simon chapter on "Cognitive Limits on Rationality" in *Organizations*, Lindblom's discussion of "successive limited comparisons" in his article on "The Science of Muddling Through" in the Spring 1959 issue of this *Review*, and

Pfiffner's discussion of Nicolaidis' study—especially of the multiple standards of validity of administrative decisions and the galaxy of decision and information points—in the Summer 1960 issue suggest strongly that nonrational factors often are significant components of the decision-making process. Waldo commented in *The Study of Public Administration* on this increasing awareness of nonrational factors: "The goal of rationality has not been abandoned. Rather it has been put in a new perspective: to achieve rationality demands a respect for the large area of the nonrational and much knowledge of it."

Similarly, today's lawyer must be prepared to understand and to cope with nonrational factors that enter into agency decision-making. In striving to elicit agency policies and decisions favorable to the interests of his clients, he frequently must become a student of the cultural and psychological conditioning of actual and potential decision-makers, to say nothing of the possible effect of clubs, friendships, and car pools in molding attitudes or policies.

To the bulk of administrative lawyers who have been able neither to "lick" the institutional decision through greater judicialization of the decision-making process nor to "join" it through *ex parte* influence, the concrete delineation of its multitude of contours, channels, and foci—nonrational as well as rational—has become the key to effective practice.

Administrative Lawyer's Role

To be more explicit about the administrative lawyer today, he has a materially different focus than in the 1930's and early '40's. Much of the explanation for that shift in focus stems from the very fact that a definitive treatise on administrative law could be written. The early battles between the regulators and the regulated were keyed to questions of the constitutional validity and the limits and contours of legislative delegation and administrative regulation. As in the geographic development of the nation, there was vehement conflict over "boundary" disputes. But the boundaries have now been generally defined and accepted, if not agreed on, as we move into the 1960's.

Thus, while it is obviously important to recognize (and teach about in both public administration and administrative law courses)

the fact that the outer limits of administrative policy-making were judicially molded in landmark cases like *Morgan*, *Schechter Poultry*, *Panama Refining*, et al., it is at least equally important to recognize that today the courts do not exercise the principal planning or controlling power over the administrative process. Judicial hostility toward administrative decision-making, which reached blatant proportions twenty-five years ago, has been replaced by cordiality if not outright love.

Two Recent Cases

This point can be illustrated with two typical Supreme Court cases which were decided unanimously.

Moog Industries v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, raised the question whether a regulatory agency could order a single firm to cease and desist from alleged violations of the price discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act without proceeding at the same time against similar violations by the firm's competitors. Moog had contended that the firm would suffer irreparable financial harm if prohibited from engaging in pricing practices that remained open to competitors.

The Supreme Court sanctioned the FTC's action as part of the agency's discretionary power. In the course of its opinion, the Court stressed the "specialized experienced judgment," the "expert understanding," and the "special competence" of the Commission. In the shaping of remedies within the framework of regulatory legislation, "an agency is called upon to exercise its specialized, experienced judgment. Thus, the decision as to whether or not an order against one firm to cease and desist from engaging in illegal price discrimination should go into effect before others are similarly prohibited depends on a variety of factors peculiarly within the expert understanding of the Commission." Although an allegedly illegal practice may appear to permeate an entire industry, "whether such appearances reflect fact and whether all firms in the industry should be dealt with in a single proceeding or should receive individualized treatment are questions that call for discretionary determination by the administrative agency."

Furthermore, the Court concluded, "the Commission alone is empowered to develop that enforcement policy best calculated to

achieve the ends contemplated by Congress and to allocate its available funds and personnel in such a way as to execute its policy efficiently and economically." Only a "patent abuse of discretion" could justify overturning the Commission's discretionary determination.

In *FTC v. Mandel Brothers*, 359 U.S. 44, the regulatory agency found that a Chicago department store had substantially misbranded its furs. Mandel was found to have violated three of the six disclosure requirements of the Fur Products Labeling Act. The Commission issued cease and desist orders against misbranding in three other categories of the Fur Products Labeling Act, despite the agency's failure to find violations by Mandel in these latter categories.

Citing the Commission's "wide discretion" in the choice of a remedy "deemed adequate to cope with the unlawful practices disclosed by the record," Justice Douglas maintained that "this agency, like others, may fashion its relief to restrain other like or unlawful acts." Where there are findings of substantial and extensive misbranding the Commission may conclude within its discretion that "like and related acts of misbranding should be enjoined as a prophylactic and preventive measure."

The *Moog* and *Mandel* cases are but representative samples of the encouragement offered by the judiciary to agency discretion, initiative, and expertise in the formulation of regulatory policies and the management of their powers and resources.

Consequences for the Practicing Lawyer

What has happened in the past twenty-five years has been stated candidly and succinctly by Justice Frankfurter in his foreword to E. Barrett Prettyman's *Trial by Agency*. The "enormous increase" in the incidence of administrative law, he maintains, has resulted in "building up, largely in empiric fashion, a body of law not formulated by legislatures and of adjudications not made by courts and, to no small extent, not subject to their oversight." Needless to say, this is the view not of a hostile commentator but of one who regards this development as "a response to the compelling need of society" and one which "penetrates the whole gamut of human affairs."

If much of the body of administrative law is not subject to legislative or judicial super-

vision, it is nonetheless a vital part of the "bread and butter" of the administrative lawyer. Familiarity with statutes and court opinions alone is no longer adequate to assure representation of his clients' interests. He must, and in many instances he has, become an expert on the administrative process in its broadest meaning. This perhaps explains why a content analysis of the quarterly *Administrative Law Bulletin* (soon to change its title to the *Administrative Law Review*), published by the Administrative Law Section of the American Bar Association, reveals that almost 75 per cent of its articles and reports deal with agency organization and processes. The successful practitioner must know how agency powers and processes are utilized within the agency setting. He must apply to his practice recognition of the fact that, as Justice Frankfurter pointed out in *San Diego Building Trades v. Garmon*, 359 U.S. 236, "Administration is more than a means of regulation; administration is regulation."

Public Administrators and Administrative Lawyers

The young man just out of law school who does not know enough about organization, management, and policy-making processes within the agencies with which he will be concerned can become a Don Quixote tilting at windmills or, worse, a frustrated specialist in obstruction and delay. The young administrator with a fresh M.A. or Ph.D. degree who has not learned enough about the uses and manifestations of law as a device to create, channel, and control governmental power so that it may be wielded in the public interest can become a vapid, fatuous exponent of benevolent despotism.

There is no inherent inconsistency between creative administration and responsible administration, no contradiction between efficiency and traditional standards of due process and fair play. Efforts to divide "law" and "administration" into isolated, hostile camps can only impair the objectives common to both.

The Davis materials with their focus on judge-made law should be used to acquaint every potential administrator with the substance of the law of administration and the role the courts have played and are playing in delineating it. On the other hand, the works

of Appleby, Fesler, Millett, Redford, Simon, White, Waldo, *et al.*, are equally relevant to the training of the administrative lawyer.

Both professions could profit distinctly from preparation of several series of case studies, some already undertaken by the Inter-University Case Program, which can show the agencies' internal processes of decision-making. Some of my law school friends say that these materials cannot be obtained in sufficient number and detail to make useful casebooks. They point to the fact that Court decisions are of public record and that, although final decisions of the agencies may be obtainable, agency processes cannot be dug out and compiled in casebook form. While we must recognize this difficulty, it is not insurmountable. It may well be that such teaching materials could not be compiled by an individual. They could however be the product of group endeavor in which men from private practice, federal service, and the teaching profession pool their resources and capacities so that precise, comprehensive analyses of administration as regulation can be developed and used in the training of new generations of lawyers and administrators.

Questions About Regulation

Several questions about federal regulatory agencies and procedures lie on the frontier, going beyond the area developed by Davis.

Evaluation of Regulatory Agency Goals

Does the lawyer who practices before the agency or the administrator who must formulate agency policy really know the agency's goals? Is Congress capable of establishing specific, unequivocal goals for the agencies?

In the Transportation Act of 1958, for example, one finds that Congress established two sets of mutually contradictory goals in order to achieve a compromise between the interests of the railroads and those of the trucks. On the one hand, Congress instructed the ICC to establish rates for one form of transportation without considering the impact of those rates on any other form of transportation. On the other hand, Congress instructed the ICC to give due consideration to the "objectives of the National Transportation Policy," which objectives have been construed consistently to require consideration of

the impact of pricing by one form of transportation upon other forms of transportation.

In this type of situation the legislature "passes the buck" to the administrative agency which, in turn, may pass it on to the courts. By the time there is an authoritative interpretation of the policy of the statute, years will have been consumed in needless litigation. Existing theories of public administration and administrative law are not geared to cope with mutually contradictory tasks. An empirical study of the ways in which the ICC's staff seeks to resolve this perplexing problem could be of assistance to theory building as well as to the preparation of legal briefs.

A similar problem stemming from the uncertainty of congressional intent afflicts the other regulatory agencies. For example, Congress has not been able to pass a Natural Gas Act that would give clear-cut instructions to the Power Commission on standards to be utilized in fixing rates. In the absence of explicit standards the subject becomes a source of perpetual protracted litigation. The FCC has been applying to the current technological revolution a set of standards adopted by Congress when crystal radio sets were in their prime. Despite the agency's pleas for clarification of congressional intent the legislature has been unable or unwilling to promulgate a new statute with clear-cut instructions on standards to be applied by the agency. Is there a connection between time-worn, amorphous, or contradictory standards and the problem of inordinate delay of and undue influence over agency decisions?

Overlapping Authority

What happens when questions submitted to one regulatory agency for decision affect directly the powers of other agencies? Is the apportionment of administrative power adequate to the tasks assigned the agencies? Should the functions of several agencies in a similar area be combined into a single agency? For example, should the ICC, CAB, FPC, and Federal Maritime Board be combined into a single transportation agency? As matters now stand, the ICC has jurisdiction over railroads, trucks, and inland-waterway barges; the CAB regulates airlines; the FPC, gas pipe lines; and the Maritime Board conditions of competition by American shipping firms in the foreign sphere. To what extent is each agency bound

to become a spokesman for the branch of transportation it regulates, and to what extent do these "spokesman" roles produce inter-agency conflict over long-range transportation policy?

After the ICC was created in 1887, the railroads had a virtual monopoly of freight transportation. Today the railroads' share of the market is less than 50 per cent. Can an agency fulfill its regulatory function when it has jurisdiction over only a limited segment of the field it is supposed to regulate? In short, are new allocations of regulatory power advisable or necessary?

"Judicialized" Proceedings vs. Other Types

Given x dollars in an agency's budget, is the agency likely to reach a more rational and effective decision through formulation of a policy expressed in a rule or through an adjudicatory proceeding? The facts of *Boston and Maine Railroad v. U.S.*, 358 U.S. 68, for example, indicate that the ICC preferred issuing a declaratory order in an adjudicatory proceeding to holding a rule-making proceeding for establishing *per diem* rates for freight car hire. Opponents of the agency's action contended that, since the ICC was determining a rate of uniform application throughout the industry, it must engage in an investigation under its rule-making authority. The Court declined to decide the question pending reconsideration by the ICC, but the question whether adjudication, rule-making, or perhaps some other device is most effective in formulating and declaring agency policy calls for and is suited by empirical examination by lawyers and administrators.

The Role of Experts

There was much discussion and debate over expertise in the 1930's and early 1940's. Today, however, the importance of expertise is proclaimed by agencies and supported by judges. But it is studied by no one. What is the expertise of administrative decision-making today? Do the regulatory agencies really possess it? To what extent, for example, have private industry, private law firms, management consultants and the like raided the agencies and taken away their experts? Are there adequate incentives in government to attract experts to the career service? Must an

agency like the FPC rely on statistics of the American Gas Association on natural gas reserves in the agency's rate-making proceedings? Are the allegations of communications industry representatives correct that the state of knowledge of the FCC's technical staff is as much as a year behind current technological developments and that the agency's decisions suffer as a result?

The status and utilization of the expert in administrative decision-making is of equal concern to the lawyer who must serve his client before the agency and to the student of administration who is concerned with maximizing the efficiency and rationality of administrative decisions.

Conclusions

A series of propositions can, perhaps, best summarize the major contentions of this article:

1. Law is a key component of the administrative process, but it represents, nonetheless, only a single dimension of a multidimensional process.
2. Despite the fact that a third of the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions deal with administrative law, the scope and magnitude of the administrative process today are so broad that a significant proportion of agency policies and decisions are not, in practice, subject to judicial review.
3. The courts stand, not at the apex of a hierarchy of authorities controlling the administrative process, but on what in practice turns out to be a coordinate plane with legislators and administrators. Whether for rational or nonrational, legal or nonlegal reasons, legislators and administrators direct and control the administrative process at least as effectively as the courts.
4. Present and potential administrators must understand how concepts like due process and fair play, as manifested in specific principles of administrative law, are vital to the efficiency and long-range development of the administrative process as a device for making, implementing and enforcing policy.
5. The successful administrative lawyer, in the present era of judicial support for administrative discretion which contrasts with the judicial hostility of the '30's, must understand

and cope with the nonlegal and nonrational factors which can determine or explain administrative actions.

6. Professor Davis' *Treatise*, preferably, but his *Text* at least, should be required reading for administrators, in addition to having its obvious and assured place on lawyers' shelves. It is a monumental compilation, analysis and critique of the legal side of the administrative process; and one does not have to agree with all the approaches and conclusions to recog-

nize the author's mammoth contribution to our understanding of a crucial and expanding sector of the law.

7. The time is appropriate for lawyers and administrators, law teachers, and public administration professors to cease cultivating the art of mutual misunderstanding and to pool their talents and resources. The result could well be an administrative process that combines creativity, flexibility and speed with responsibility and fair play.

The Inner-Directed Field Man

By LYLE E. CRAINE, School of Natural Resources, University of Michigan

THE FOREST RANGER, by Herbert Kaufman.
Johns Hopkins Press, 1960. Pp. 259. \$5.00.

DECENTRALIZATION has long been a challenge to large organizations. Today, it is one of the major challenges for the leaders of an expanding bureaucracy who seek to keep their programs "close to the people." The literature on decentralization is consequently bountiful, but Professor Kaufman has given us something new.

The Forest Ranger is a penetrating and provocative study of how the United States Forest Service has decentralized its responsibilities for national forest administration. Since there is evidence that the Forest Service has been unusually successful in maintaining both responsive and responsible field administration, it is deserving of the careful study which the author has given it. And, since the forest ranger as administrator of the basic field unit—the ranger district—is the most decentralized position on which the full scope of responsibility for national forest administration devolves, it is appropriate that he should be the focus for this study.

To See the Forest as Well as the Trees

Following the methods of the cultural anthropologist, the author set out to know and understand intimately five forest rangers, selected because they represented varied backgrounds and were confronted with different kinds of forest management problems. Kaufman tried to understand the working methods and relations of the forest ranger in his pivo-

tal position between the forest, the people who use it, and the agency's leaders who must be politically responsible. In its approach, this is a case study, but it is more than a study of specific cases; it is a systematic examination of the whole species, "forest ranger." Even more important, it is a study of the administrative behavior of the entire Forest Service from the worm's eye perspective of the ranger.

Professor Kaufman, with disciplined precision, concentrates his analysis on how the Forest Service assures that "... the daily decisions and actions of the lower echelons make concrete realities of policy statements and declared objectives of the leadership. . . ." The author's skilled and intelligent balancing of insights from anthropology, sociology, and psychology with traditional administrative and organizational observations is one of his important contributions. The interdependencies of personnel, budgeting, communications, public relations and all the tools of administration are given sharper meaning and significance as they are brought together in "an organic unity with what have hitherto been discrete bodies of literature—on human relations, informal organization, bureaucracy, as well as the sociology, anthropology, and social psychology of administration." In a sense this is an "ecological" study of administration. Its emphases upon interrelations among elements of administration disclose little new about any one of them. Rather, its contribution is in the understanding it gives to the fabric of interaction among them. It is this that gives reality to administrative study.

For Every Force an Opposing Force?

A premise of this book is that the administrative performance of a field officer is the resultant of two opposing forces: the centrifugal forces which impel him to strive for independence, with tendencies to fragment policy and administration, and institutional constraints which seek to channel his energies toward agency goals. Kaufman's analysis of national forest administration is cast in this mold.

The forest ranger operates in an environment conducive to independence and the growth of organizational fragmentation. National forest administration is large and complex, and the whole scope of responsibilities devolves upon the ranger within his district. The forest ranger is a little "chief forester" for his domain. In addition, the author finds, the impulse toward fragmentation is strengthened by such "challenges to agency unity" as (1) the difficulty of internal communication; (2) the tendency for rangers to be influenced by the working habits and attitudes of the local work groups he employs; (3) the efforts of local populations to "capture" the ranger's loyalty and allegiance; (4) personal differences of rangers; and (5) the ideology of decentralization which has been a tenet of the Forest Service from its inception.

Against these forces toward fragmentation, the author finds three types of institutional measures impelling unified performance from the 792 rangers: (1) devices for "performing decisions"; (2) procedures for detecting and discouraging deviation, and—most important and unusual—(3) measures for developing the will and capacity to conform.

In Kaufman's view the whole hierarchy of policy pronouncements are in effect a set of "performed decisions," i.e., decisions made by higher-ups in advance of specific situations requiring a choice to be made by the ranger. Courses of action to be taken for designated categories of events and conditions are described in great detail in the Forest Service Manual. "The field officers then need determine only into what category a particular circumstance falls; . . . he then simply follows the series of steps applicable to that category." The Forest Service employs three methods of "performed decisions" for the rangers: (1) by administrative authorization, direction and prohibition; (2) by requirements that rangers

clear certain proposed decisions with superior officers before they take effect and submit disputes arising from ranger decisions to higher-ups; and (3) by the cooperative development of comprehensive financial and workload plans.

"To determine whether behavior of the men in the field conforms to the requirements of performed decisions . . . the leaders must obviously keep themselves informed about what actually goes on in the field." Among the devices employed by the Service for detecting deviations by the rangers are: (1) reporting, (2) diaries of rangers, (3) basic management staff services, (4) inspections, (5) hearings on appeals, and (6) movement of personnel. Thus, with the methods of performing decisions and with devices for detecting and sanctions for discouraging deviation ". . . the Forest Service may be described as a system that has been 'programmed' and equipped with a built-in 'feedback loop.'"

But "such analogies can be misleading because the human range of response to programming is infinitely broader and more complex than the responses of mechanical or electrical contrivances. . . . Achieving integration in machines of the most complicated kind is simple compared to achieving it in associations of human beings." No matter how complete the programming, how elaborate and sensitive the feedback, or how forceful and relentless the techniques of correcting deviations, human "gears" tend to respond to a variety of extraneous influences and consequently behave in ways the leaders do not expect or want. "Under these conditions, it was inevitable that managers should try to control what goes on *inside* each individual organization member, to get him to do *of their own volition* what the managers want them to do, and to equip them with the resources of skill and knowledge for those duties." On this note, Kaufman turns to an examination of the factors which operate to develop a will and capacity in its employees to conform to Forest Service goals and directions. It is in this respect that the Forest Service seems most unusual.

Developing Conformity

The professional and bureaucratic empathy with which Forest Service employees are en-

dowed—from the ranger district to the Washington office—appears to give the Service a plus factor without which devices for performing decisions and detecting deviations are merely so much headquarters red-tape to be performed perfunctorily or ignored. Three factors contribute to the highly developed will and capacity to conform in the Forest Service.

Of first importance is the selection process which seeks and encourages only the most strongly motivated to dedicate themselves to forestry. At least in the past, the practice of forestry largely had its expression through the Forest Service and dedication to forestry was equated with dedication to the Service. "Willingness to conform is in this sense employed as an initial criterion of selection, a standard applied to themselves by young men crossing the threshold to professional training," Kaufman observed. Even the forestry schools, at least until the postwar expansion of private forestry, of necessity trained men to fit into the Forest Service, since the cream of their crop usually entered the Service. The author found that "... many decisions and actions taken in the field are implanted in these men during their pre-service education; appropriate behaviors are in this sense 'built into' them. Their receptivity to agency directives is thus produced not only by the constraints upon them, but also by the education and training which results in their wanting to do of their own volition what they are formally required to do."

Comprehensive in-service training is a second factor inducing a willingness to conform. This includes not only organized efforts probably like many another federal program, but also apprentice-type training in such tasks as letter writing and issuing policy statements.

The Forest Service's personnel policy also is designed to encourage the employee to fit in, to identify with the well-being of the organization and conform automatically to agency direction. Transfers and promotions aim at broadening the young recruits and promoting in them an understanding and a competence in all aspects of national forest administration—but they also are intended to build "identification with the Forest Service as a whole." In fact, during a man's early years in the Service he seldom has a chance to sink his roots anywhere. "Only one thing gives any continuity,

any structure, to his otherwise fluid world: the Service." The author masterfully describes and appraises this process of institutional acculturation during which employees are "... absorbed into the organization by a kind of gradual social osmosis, during which they, in turn, absorb many of the prevailing values, assumptions, and customary modes of operation." In this way, the ranger comes to want to do automatically what he is supposed to do.

The circumstances under which the ranger works further encourage his close identity with the Forest Service. He is consulted by the upper echelons on questions affecting field administration; as chief field officer of the Service he is accorded a high status in his community; and, he wears his uniform and badge with pride.

As a consequence of pre-service education and selection, of in-service training and of the various environmental factors which encourage their identity with the Service, forest rangers see their actions not as conforming but as "merely doing what is 'right.'" This is illustrated by the author's experience with the five rangers subject to study. When problems discovered in one district were posed to other rangers, there was a striking similarity in solutions and justifications suggested. Although it is not impossible that this common pattern of responses is entirely fortuitous, Kaufman finds more persuasive the inference that the modes of integration employed by the Forest Service "... have vanquished the tendencies toward fragmentation."

This "built-in" uniformity which at least inhibits deviations from the will of the leaders, seems to this reviewer the really distinctive feature of the Forest Service and may be the major factor in its success in erecting institutional constraints on the natural forces of fragmentation. Although this plus factor of spirit and loyalty in Forest Service operations often has been recognized, Kaufman is the first to give it meaningful definition, to examine the sources from which it flows, and to give it significant interpretation within the problem of maintaining responsible administration through a highly decentralized organization.

The author recognizes that this inducement of conformity poses ethical questions. What may be the key to administrative effectiveness may also approach excessive indoctrination,

with possible effects not only upon the individual's imagination and initiative but upon his personal integrity. Kaufman seems to view this as the dilemma inherent in decentralization when he concludes that:

Administrative success apparently depends on securing a fairly substantial degree of field adherence to the wishes of central headquarters. Securing this conformity, in turn, necessitates a measure of manipulation of mental processes. Undoubtedly, it can be carried to a point menacing to human dignity. But, from all indications, it cannot be eliminated from any organized human activity. It is an intrinsic attribute of large-scale organization.

Institutional Psychoanalysis and Theory

The Forest Ranger is excitingly perceptive and penetrating without being ponderous. It is a study that will have interest and significance for the general administrator and student of administrative practice and theory as well as the professional forester. For the forester, and particularly the employees and officials of the Forest Service, this study provides a kind of institutional psychoanalysis. Members of that agency should find much that will heighten their understanding and appreciation of the Service's operations. Even the architects of its administrative procedures may better understand the theoretical foundations on which their pragmatic success has been based, and therefore be more alert to the administrative adjustments required to meet changing situations ahead. The general ad-

ministrator in other agencies will surely be more aware of, and sensitive to, the forces involved in his decentralized organization for having followed Kaufman's analysis of the Forest Service. Such awareness and sensitivity are prerequisites for designing effective administrative practices in any large decentralized organization. At the same time, the unique factors in the Forest Service's success should be warning to any administrator that blind imitation is folly.

For the student of administration, this study is as significant for its methodology as for its substantive findings. It demonstrates the utility of studying organizations in terms of the forces that influence the people of the organization—the conditioners of their decisions, their actions and their reactions. The author expresses his hope that "ultimately, such studies, in conjunction with others, might contribute to the formulation of a general theory of organization, and permit us to progress from administrative description to soundly based administrative prescription."

Recognizing that these must be "... aspirations, not claims; hopes, not immediate objectives," Professor Kaufman seeks here merely "... to portray an organization accurately, to capture the drama, the excitement, the spirit of administration." In this respect *The Forest Ranger* is perhaps without a peer. But more importantly, this book bears fresh insights into many facets of administration. Its reading should be a rewarding experience to any administrator.

Preparing Public Administrators: A World Survey

By ROWLAND EGGER, University of Virginia

THE UNIVERSITY TEACHING OF SOCIAL SCIENCES: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, by André Molitor. UNESCO (UNESCO Publications Center, 801 Third Avenue, New York 17). 1960. Pp. 192. \$2.75.

MR. MOLITOR's penetrating analysis of the state of university instruction in the art and science of public administration blows a breath of cool and invigorating fresh air over a musty subject long overdue for critical and

objective re-examination. In the process he has laid a number of ghosts and bared the sterility of many clichés that have bedeviled and bemused the discussion of education in public administration at both national and international levels for several decades.

Growing Agreement on What To Teach

The efficacy of ambiguity is nowhere better illustrated than in Mr. Molitor's treatment of

the teapot tempest which has raged amongst continental protagonists of administrative science, of administrative sciences, and of administrative law. The English term "public administration" avoids the philosophical hair-splitting which has gone on between those who insist that administration is an integral and self-contained academic discipline and those who maintain that it is a "cross-road discipline" integrating the subject matter and techniques of various social sciences. It is also ambiguous enough to embrace the administrative lawyers, who, beginning with Duguit, attempted to reduce administration to a system of jurisprudence operating within the confines of legal theory.

Mr. Molitor reaches two significant conclusions:

1. While he prefers the term "administrative sciences," he does not think the controversy over either the terms or the underlying assumptions is profoundly important.

2. Those approaching the study and teaching of public administration through administrative law and those approaching it through "administrative practice" are discovering their mutually compatible and complementary roles and making progress toward accommodation, more rapidly than is generally realized. This progress is being achieved more readily in the countries which have hitherto been dominated by juridical approaches to public administration than in the countries like the U. S. where administrative practice has informed and directed the development of the discipline. As Louis Brownlow used to remind us even at the height of our ideological struggles with the juridical-minded in the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, American public administration could do with more adequate attention to its foundations and references in the law. This is a lesson that most teachers of public administration since Goodnow and Willoughby have never taken adequately to heart.

Mr. Molitor also addresses his attention to the relationships between the teaching of public and business administration, a liaison first institutionalized in the United States but which, under the impact of technical assistance and of socialism in the underdeveloped economies, has now spread throughout the world. He is not alarmed at what some members of the priesthood, especially those whose

outlook is immutably grounded in the law, regard as undisguised miscegenation. Nor is he profoundly impressed by the discovery that management in large-scale enterprise tends toward certain similarities not materially affected by the fiction of ownership of the tools of production. He points out that these similarities do not in any way "reduce the differences arising out of the ultimate purpose itself and out of the juridical pattern which reflects that purpose and shapes those differences."

Recent Changes in How to Teach

The organization of university instruction in public administration follows highly diverse patterns. In countries which have broken least with the administrative law tradition, instruction continues to be organized within the faculties of law frequently with very little nonjuridical influence on the content of the instruction. In other countries some law faculties have themselves incorporated nonjuridical elements in the teaching of public administration, and in a few countries, notably Belgium, law-oriented and practice-oriented programs peacefully co-exist side by side. At the other end of the spectrum is the United States, which exhibits neither regularity in the pattern of organization nor standards in the content of what is euphemistically described as education in public administration. Mr. Molitor seems to regard a certain amount of academic anarchy as a good thing.

The development of facilities for the direct training of administrators is a striking phenomenon in education for public administration in recent decades. The establishment of the National School of Public Administration in Paris immediately following the last war was notably successful in loosening the juridical leading strings which had long confined the French civil service. This type of training program has been imitated in a number of the newly developing countries, although at a somewhat lower level than that of the *Ecole Nationale*, which is superimposed upon university training in law or the social sciences. Even more widespread is the development of post-entry training programs, which the *Ecole Nationale* also provides, on a national and regional basis in the Middle East, South Asia, and Latin America. Molitor is firm in his

view that these institutions have achieved "a real university teaching of administrative sciences," but how long this can be sustained in an environment organizationally cut off from the well-springs of administrative learning in the social sciences, humanities and law remains to be seen.

Staffing the instructional program is a problem of pervasive and worldwide importance, and the issue of the career teacher versus the paratrooping genius from the outside has nowhere been satisfactorily resolved. Even in the United States, where mobility between the universities and the public service has been high, the battle is still being fought—nowhere more bitterly than at the institutions offering the best and most academically acceptable instruction in public administration. The inescapable facts seem to be that career teachers tend to lose touch with the operating realities of their subject matter, that administrators are generally unable to organize their material in a way which imparts form and educational value to their special knowledge and insights, and that the kind of expertise derived from administrative experience by career teachers is one of the most volatile and highly-perishable commodities known to man.

Four significant conclusions emerge from Mr. Molitor's review of methods and materials. First, the formal academic lecture as a primary element in instruction has generally given way to seminar discussion. Second, much greater emphasis is being laid on individual and cooperative research, on theses and on dissertations than is the case generally in academic instruction. Third, case studies of the nonjuridical aspects of the administrative sciences, such as those produced by the Inter-University Case Program in the United States, are receiving increased attention in many parts of the world. Fourth, clinical experience in the observation of and participation in ongoing administrative processes has been developed to a high degree in many of the programs of instruction.

Outside of the United States the lack of a copious literature specifically designed for the teaching of public administration continues to be regarded as a handicap, although an American teacher would doubtless hasten to reassure Mr. Molitor that copiousness and suitability for teaching purposes are by no means synonymous.

To Avoid Teaching More Than One Knows

As George Graham has reminded us on a number of occasions, one of the major problems in the teaching of public administration is to avoid teaching more than one knows. Mr. Molitor devotes considerable attention to scientific research in the field of the administrative sciences. Some of this research takes place in the universities, although much of what goes on under the rubric of public administration research in many American universities might more accurately be called management consulting. Official committees and commissions of inquiry have done much to enrich the literature of public administration; our attention is directed not only to the Hoover Commissions, the British Broadcasting Committee, the Franks Committee on Administrative Tribunals, but also to the work carried on by the Prime Minister's Bureau of Administrative Reform in Italy, the French Central Committee, on the Costs and Performance of the Public Service and similar organizations. In a somewhat different status are the various unofficial or semi-official organizations and research institutes in the several countries, including associations of governmental bodies, of public officials, and professional groups, such as the Royal Institute of Public Administration, the Indian Institute of Public Administration, the Brookings Institution, the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants, the "1313" organizations, etc. At the international level, working in close cooperation with its national affiliates as well as with UNESCO, the United Nations, and other intergovernmental organizations, the International Institute of Administrative Sciences exerts an important promotional and cooperative influence in public administration research. On balance, public administration research appears to be substantially ahead of education in public administration, although none would deny that important lacunae exists at a great many points in the fabric of the administrative higher learning.

An Evaluation

This is a balanced and objective treatment of a complex and still highly fluid subject. Not many men could have written it at all. Almost none could have done it as percep-

tively as André Molitor. The title page lists him modestly as professor in the University of Louvain, which he is. But those who have known him as the *chef de cabinet* of the Belgian Prime Minister and of the Ministry of Education and who have worked with him as chairman of the Contracts Supervisory Committee of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences know better the qualities of mind and spirit which he brings to the

service of international cooperation. The public administration profession throughout the world is profoundly in the debt of Mr. Molitor, of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences which staged the present inquiry, and of UNESCO which has promoted and assisted in a comprehensive survey of university teaching of the social sciences of which this is the ninth and concluding volume.

Report Card on a Management Development Course

By BERNARD J. JAMES, University of Chicago

A NORWEGIAN CONTRIBUTION TO MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT, by E. Wight Bakke. F. Beyer, Bergen, Norway, 1959—available from Yale Labor and Management Center, 333 Cedar Street, New Haven 11, Connecticut. Pp. 158. \$2.50.

MR. BAKKE, Director of the Yale University Labor and Management Center, reports here on the evaluation of a management development program conducted at Solstrand by the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration.

The Solstrand program is an eleven-week residential split into a five-week spring and a six-week autumn unit. Men in attendance come from top levels of Norwegian business and industry; their responsibilities vary from plant manager to department head. Educational techniques used at Solstrand include the syndicate or group project method, the case method, lectures, role play, special reports to plenary sessions and informal consultation between educators and participants.

Data were collected by 105 interviews of participants, their superiors, peers and subordinates, and by follow-up questionnaire responses from 67 of those interviewed. The report essentially concerns three categories of data: (1) personal benefits reported by participants, (2) organizational benefits reported by participants and their nonparticipating colleagues, and (3) the relative value of course methods.

Personal benefits ranked high by interviewed participants include the following, in

order of decreasing value as participants saw them: "a more satisfactory conception of the self; personal growth and widened horizons; increased capacity for self-expression in general, with people, and at work; better understanding of people whose cooperation they need; improved ability to utilize others' ideas, resources and help; augmented sense of support from others." Most respondents to the questionnaire experienced positive values with respect to nearly two-thirds of the total number of benefits (30) identified by interview.

Organizational benefits reported include: delegation, gathering and use of information, supervision, handling of conflict, and clarification of objectives. Some fifty-four separate skills, categorized within nine managerial processes, are included in the questionnaire.

The relative value of various aspects of the Solstrand program are reported as follows: The Group Project method, in which groups of ten men work on problems such as accounting and managerial controls and relations of State and private enterprise, was found to be the most valued experience. It was especially effective under the direction of a trained, permanent member of the Solstrand staff. Case analysis was considered a positive component of the program by respondents, though some of the approximately forty cases used were considered to be somewhat artificial versions of management problems. Reporting by group chairmen to the plenary sessions was considered beneficial by a minority of participants, largely those who valued oral reporting ex-

perience. Role playing was moderately successful but considered by many "primarily good or poor entertainment depending on the competence of the players." Lectures, evidently rated low in interviews, were found to rate high on follow-up questionnaires. The report suggests that they are most effective if used to present an overview of a subject to persons unacquainted with a body of knowledge or to present complex data quickly to an audience that has had experience in collegiate lecture settings. The Solstrand library was used infrequently unless assignments were made by group leaders. The report concludes that all of the techniques have merit if used in an integrated manner for specific educational purposes.

Weaknesses of Method

The major weakness of the Solstrand evaluation is methodological. Before-after measures of program impact and use of controls were precluded because some 100 men had already completed the course before Bakke was invited to undertake the evaluation. The report does not, therefore, contain adequate measures of program effect beyond participant opinion. Much of the information gathered from participants is thus foredoomed to be merely the kind of "happiness data" presented in the usual impressionistic evaluations. This problem could have been overcome to some degree, I believe, if more precise comparison had been made between participant and non-participant data at hand.

The report also fails to compare Solstrand experience with what has been done elsewhere, implying a uniqueness to the Norwegian program which I do not feel exists. All of the educational techniques employed there have been used extensively in adult education for at least ten years (in extension education for professional groups, for example) and efforts to evaluate such programs have been quite common in adult education for almost as long. Bakke's report is far more comprehensive than most such evaluations have been, however.

Reinforcement from the Chicago Experience

Solstrand's experience with various techniques closely parallels ours at the Center for

Programs in Government Administration where we have conducted numerous executive education programs for federal, psychiatric, police and local government administrators, and where we are in the midst of lengthy evaluation studies. The group project approach, we have found, is extremely valuable, if its usual nondirective form is not permitted to deteriorate to a faith in happy accidents. Case methods are of moderate value; a useful variant can be presentation by a participant of a case from his own organization for critical consideration by the group. We have found, too, that role playing is usually disappointing unless used to illustrate identifiable principles, e.g., the effects of communication patterns on leadership style. The lecture method is an indispensable device, we have found. It can help indicate to participants the scope of a body of knowledge and it can identify connections between complex ideas that the average manager could not establish unaided. It also can help overcome the resistance to intellectual growth which is not unusual among executive development participants, often camouflaged as an insistence on "practicality."

Of special importance to persons responsible for management development programs is the Solstrand report's recommendation that careful consideration be given methods for selecting and orienting participants. The problem of misplaced expectations can be materially lessened by pre-attendance conferences between officers responsible for nomination of participants, the participants themselves, and educators designing the program.

Some Implications

Considering the unavoidable methodological handicaps Mr. Bakke faced from the outset of the evaluation, his interpretation of the data has many significant implications. "A more satisfactory conception of self" was the most frequently reported personal benefit; improved skill in the "authority processes" was the most frequently reported organizational benefit. The fact that such "human" factors loom large in the Solstrand list of benefits implies that problems of psychological safety and status, sometimes antithetical forces in an organization, are prominent concerns of Norwegian managers. Both are aspects of the fu-

sion of personal motive and organizational purpose that Bakke calls a central problem of the individual in modern managerial enterprise.

The Solstrand report is further evidence that the best place to attack the problem of management development may be at the social-psychological level, in contrast with more traditional management approaches. A man-

agement curriculum for the 1960's can profitably absorb a great many ideas from small-group behavioral research as well as psychiatry if the "conception of self" that the administrator expresses in workaday affairs is to be understood as integral to organizational experience. It is this kind of broader implication of the Bakke report that makes it very much worth while for management educators.

Ah, Youth!

During World War II many emergency agencies were created in order to cope with special problems.

It was pointed out to the head of one of these agencies that his deputy, his division chiefs, and the key members of his organization were each under 40 years of age, and that the average age of all his employees was close to 30. He was asked whether this circumstance was accidental or planned.

"The task assigned to this agency is, as every fully mature person knows, a completely impossible one. If I had recruited specialists of long experience, they would have been aware that their assigned responsibilities could not actually be carried out. However, the youngsters I have don't know this, so they're doing successfully what can't be done."

—WILLIAM BRODY, Philadelphia Department of Health.

Developments in Public Administration

Compiled by WILLIAM B. SHORE

Publications Officer

American Society for Public Administration

Toward a Smoother Change

"With circumstances generally much more favorable and with added attention to planning and preparation in the coming months, we can help to bring about during the next change in administration a smoother transition [than in 1953] which will be of service to our country." This was the pre-election assurance of Roger W. Jones, chairman of the U. S. Civil Service Commission and a long-time career man. ("1961 Top Team Must 'Hit the Ground Running'" *1 Civil Service Journal* 2 (July-September, 1960).) Jones also felt that Schedule C—key positions requiring appointees in whom political executives have personal confidence—was in good order and "that this aspect of the transition period will be smoother than in the past." (Letter of transmittal, U. S. Civil Service Commission Report to House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, "Maintaining the Integrity of the Career Civil Service," September 12, 1960.)

Even the National Federation of Federal Employees executive council felt encouraged though warning that "any change in National Administration . . . inevitably results in patronage pressure . . ." and "is certain to have an impact on the civil service." The NFFE council is heartened, however, by the President-elect's statement in support of the merit principle, a report by the Civil Service Commission that "shows a constructive awareness of the importance and impact of this problem," and the fact that "during the recent national political campaign career Federal employees were not subjected to the kind of baseless broadside smear attacks which have disfigured some national campaigns in the recent past and were so destructive of morale in

the Federal service." (Press release, undated; received November 14, 1960.)

To Promote—not Just Survive—Change

"Regardless of his party affiliation, the incoming President has a new mandate from the electorate, which will involve new policies, new programs, and new emphases or interpretations of existing policies and programs." ". . . The entire Federal establishment must respond, fully and promptly . . ." federal personnel officers agreed in a special conference on the transition co-sponsored by Brookings Institution and the Interagency Advisory Group last January. ("Report—Conference of Directors of Personnel held at Williamsburg, Virginia, January 20-23, 1960" (U. S. Civil Service Commission).)

Experience indicates, the conference held, that preparations "will help to bring about an orderly and prompt response to the expressed will of the electorate while minimizing the shocks and damages to the machinery of Government." The preparations should include educational programs for career personnel "on party platforms, background and speeches of candidates, and problems that face new political employees." Once appointed, the political executives' background and views should be presented to career employees.

Jones, too, tried to put civil servants in the mood for innovation: ". . . I think one of the healthiest and most valuable attitudes a political executive can bring to his job is skepticism about precedents and the courage to make changes" and "the career staff has a deep and continuing obligation to preserve as much freedom of choice among alternatives for their superiors as their expertise can develop." He, too, urged full acquaintance with party platforms and candidate statements before the

election, and he praised as useful indexed collections of platforms and party and candidate views prepared by some government offices in 1952 and 1956, urging "a real effort to gain an understanding of the commitments and thought processes of the new executive leadership."

(Since Henry, Ahlberg and Moynihan document, in articles above, the failure of successful candidates to carry out their party platforms or to effect their campaign promises, and since we recognize that party and personal differences are deliberately sharpened during the pre-election period, it may be that the civil servant who has memorized platforms and campaign views will be labelled hopelessly naive or contrarily that he might lead the political executive into a trap in which the latter will feel pressed to take more radical action than he otherwise would, simply because his career advisers seem to expect it of him.)

"The Most Crucial Single Area"

"The most crucial single area in developing a transition program concerns the orientation of the new political executive," the personnel officers concluded.

Jones, too, emphasized this aspect. He put the responsibility on the career executive to make his new principal aware of the ground rules of government which differ from those of nonpublic employment, e.g., equal treatment of all citizens, the public's right to know, governmental checks and balances, integration of diverse groups, the merit system etc. Before he is firmly behind his desk, congressional committees will ask his views, appropriation hearings will be held, the press will call. He needs to know immediately about members of Congress particularly concerned with his agency, about the difference between his responsibility to Congress and what might have been his previous relationship to a corporation board of directors, and about what the public will not tolerate which might have been completely acceptable for a nonpublic executive.

Other orientation aids, suggested by Jones and the personnel officer conference: acquaint the new executive with his staff, perhaps using an inventory of personnel showing special abilities, jobs and background; help him staff the agency, using schedules A, B, and C as appropriate, and even help recruit partisan

appointments, though he should not be the one to clear them through the party; (the personnel officer conference went further, urging personnel people to make "full use of the administrative flexibilities that are inherent in the career system" and to use schedule C); explain the merit system's operation; persuade him of the importance of the budget; explain the laws, regulations, traditions and court decisions which bound agency action; define agency goals and the value conflicts that make the goals ambiguous if they are; tell him about the role of the General Accounting Office, Budget Bureau, Justice Department, Civil Service Commission and General Services Administration.

The personnel officers recommended an initial orientation by the White House and co-ordination of later orientation, followed by a session between incoming and outgoing executives aided by career people, and finally a briefing by agency career people on internal operations, external relations, compilations of policy issuances and similar records, immediate problems, and information about the new executive's own position and its perquisites.

The Civil Service Commission, in its report to the House Committee, asserted that the primary responsibility for orienting new executives should fall on the career executives in each agency, though the Commission distributed a pamphlet briefly sketching the proper relationship of political and career executives, explaining the merit system, and trying to build the confidence of the newcomer in the career man's willingness and ability to help him.

Even the Congress was not forgotten in orientation programs. The Commission will hold a series of briefing sessions for House members and staff on the federal personnel system. Sixty-seven staff aides to senators attended such sessions this year.

A Different Note—the Political Executive's

These were views and plans of career people. A different note was sounded by a political executive, the President's special assistant for personnel management, Eugene J. Lyons. He chided civil servants for thinking of themselves as more "dedicated" than other men, for the "overwhelming emphasis on personal security that seems to influence the actions of

some . . . , particularly when a change in Administration appears imminent," for the self-pitying conviction that only *their* bosses change often and that business executives' do not (which he says is not true). He scolded "a few in the career service who secretly resent men from what they term the 'outside'" and make their work more difficult. He repeated Luther Gulick's warning against an irresponsible bureaucracy.

Career executives only have the right to ask, he stated: "Please do not pre-judge us. Give us the opportunity to carry out your program in the manner you desire." And please fire us if you are not satisfied.

But he, too, recognized the need for "a formal orientation program for incoming political executives."

Defense of Merit

Finally, Jones and the personnel officers insisted on the importance of defending the merit system particularly at this time. "While job security is not an end in itself, during transitional periods any threat to job security not based on efficiency or program needs is a threat to the integrity of the merit system," Jones said. This is echoed by the personnel men, with one proviso: "It must be recognized, though, that, at the upper levels of the career service, job security is a product of demonstrated competence, with minimum emphasis on statutory safeguards." And the Commission's report added that when high level career people are incompatible with their political superiors, "the Commission's energies would be better spent for the good of the service and the individual in assisting a willing career employee to 'move over' than to engage in a battle of wits and technicalities to prevent him from being 'pushed out.'"

The House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service also promised "to maintain a careful scrutiny of personnel activities during the transition period to insure full and scrupulous adherence to the laws and regulations for the protection of the career civil service."

Further Study

In addition to publishing Laurin Henry's book exploring four presidential transitions of the past, Brookings Institution has begun a study of the current transition. Many members

of incoming and outgoing administrations will serve (among others) as advisers.

Information About Government and Public Policy—Getting It and Getting It Across

"In the years ahead, the nation will have to make decisions of frightening importance on short notice. It will not always enjoy the former luxury of waiting for its articulate citizens to become informed, for public opinion to jell, and for that opinion to make itself felt in government."

To meet the need for continuous public understanding of government and public policies (expressed in these words by Dean Edward W. Barrett of the Graduate School of Journalism, Columbia University) some writers have urged government to improve its public information policies; others have placed primary burden on the press.

The Press and the Official—Allies or Enemies?

" . . . The reporter and the man in government are natural allies; since it is the reporter's business to portray the national situation to the American people, and since the man in government cannot do what needs doing unless the American people understand the national situation. . . .

" . . . The vast majority of politicians and officials are passionately interested in the problems they have to deal with. They enjoy talking about those problems with anyone who can discuss the problems fairly intelligently. Other things being equal, they like their own pet problems to be sensibly presented to the general public. So if you have a fair understanding of the nature of a problem, the responsible official will usually be glad to talk to you about the problem with considerable frankness."

This is the view of two newspapermen. (Joseph and Stewart Alsop, *The Reporter's Trade* (Reynal & Co., 1958).)

"Officials and reporters are natural enemies, because the reporter always wants what the official should not give him." This is the view of an official, Charles E. Bohlen (quoted by the Alsops).

The Alsops recognize, in fact, that the official rejects the "natural" alliance: "No government in history, alas, has ever voluntarily told the whole truth, or anything like the

whole truth, in its official statements, its approved discourses and its organized press conferences."

But even in complaining about "a habit of secrecy" in Washington in the 1950's and a harassment of newsmen who dig up what was supposed to have remained buried, the Alsops make clear that the purpose is not to hide scandals. The penchant for secrecy comes from a "progressive *embourgeoisement*, the growing desire to put up a good front" and from a belief that the people cannot understand critical issues and should not be informed during the decision process.

Contrarily, the Alsops believe "the whole truth is only revealed or approximated by long public debate." In the Roosevelt Administration and early Truman years, differences of opinion were fought out in public, according to the Alsops. It was "disorderly" but it dramatized the issues in the human terms in which they are more easily understood by the public.

Criticism of Secrecy in Europe

A British economist, Ely Devons, argues the same case as it applies to Great Britain—that the issues should be made clear while policy is being developed, not suppressed until a policy is announced. The government argues, he notes, that the exposure of internal disagreements would give the political opposition ammunition with which to attack it and so "weaken the standing of the executive with the public." He quotes the Treasury Department solicitor as saying, "'One ought not to have a situation in which the conflict of departmental policies is threshed out in public.'"

The second pro-secrecy argument is that government business consists of negotiating compromises and "this can be done successfully only . . . in secret conclave. . . ." Devons replies that government by secret negotiation ignores "principle and a wider public interest" and that "more limelight is . . . one of the most effective ways of preventing politics from degenerating into a mere subtle balancing of the interests of conflicting pressure groups."

There is "a deeper, although unacknowledged, reason for reluctance to admit the public to a full view of events," Devons suggests:

"a mistrust of the general public; a fear that they will not understand or will be unwilling to face the truth; a feeling that the public must be cajoled, wheedled, seduced and exhorted, rather than convinced by logical argument and debate; a dread that if the whole complexity of the situation is revealed it will be misinterpreted and misjudged. These, plus the temptation to keep information secret, because exclusive knowledge means power, seem to me to be the main motive forces. . . ." He notes in support of this view that it is easy for those who "move in the right circles" to find out what goes on, as long as they don't bite the hand that feeds them information. Devons is confident that the public can participate in the raw debate and that political democracy "implies" its participation. ("Government in the Inner Circle," 24 *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 523-526 (No. 4, 1958).)

Devons' former colleague, political scientist Brian Chapman, speaks equally strongly:

. . . The recent awareness [in Europe] of the need for better government public relations has gone no further than communicating to the public what the public service concerned is doing rather than why it is doing it. Only in Sweden are any effective measures taken to ensure the maximum publicity for government business. . . . It may be that no public can be trusted, but since no government in Europe, outside Sweden, has ever tried it, the evidence is incomplete. Public stampedes, to judge from the past, have always been caused by lack of information, or twisted information, not by a surfeit. (*The Profession of Government*. (Macmillan Co., 1959).)

To at least one recent European observer, our government is, by contrast, extremely open with the public. "One is struck by the mass of information published by the American administration in all forms," the chief of the orientation and information service of the French Association for the Increase of Productivity observed. ". . . The American mentality is hostile to secrets" and the American administrator has relatively less power to regulate than the European, he contended. "In many cases in which, in Europe, one regulates, in America, one recommends. Now, if it is possible, and unfortunately frequent, that an order might be executed without having been understood, it is rare that advice would be followed if it is not explained. Since it must

convince, the American administration must then inform." Preferring to persuade rather than constrain, American administrators furnish citizens with very practical explanations of legislation and even take the initiative to explain its public purpose. (Raoul Perol, "La politique de l'Administration américaine à l'égard du public," *La Revue Administrative*, pp. 199-206 (March-April, 1960). My translation.)

Deception as Well as Silence

But selective reporting in large volume can be a technique of secrecy, Chairman John E. Moss of our House subcommittee on government information contends:

Not only has the Pentagon invented dozens of different ways of keeping information secret, but it has full-time platoons of press agents managing news and attempting to dull reporters' senses through floods of handouts. ("Your Newspaper-Freedom's Guardian," address delivered October 8, 1960, Reno, Nevada.)

A case of a factually-accurate report drawing attention away from agency difficulties—putting up a good front—was submitted recently to the *Review* by R. R. Dince, Chairman of the Division of Finance, College of Business Administration, University of Georgia, who has done extensive research on the Export-Import Bank. Dince notes that the Bank claims an "incredibly low" percentage of defaults—\$2.9 million out of \$10 billion loans authorized over twenty-six years. But by "careful reading and year-by-year comparison of the credit descriptions found in the Bank's annual reports," it is apparent that delinquencies are \$20 million. For example, loans to Bolivia and Afghanistan have been repeatedly extended, sometimes without any comment in the report, and Bolivia's payments are nevertheless in default. Only one of five loans to China is current; the others, totalling \$29 million, have been in default since 1949 and are really due from Communist China. The Bank's reports stopped mentioning the delinquency of the loans in 1956 and now simply carry them as though they were solvent. Since 1955, semi-annual reports carry no special mention of defaults and arrearages, and the claim that only \$2.9 million has been written off as bad debt was unqualified by referral to the delinquent loans, yet these loans can be

considered capable of being repaid "only so long as the Eximbank does not insist that they be repaid." Although Dince feels that the Bank's program is highly successful, hiding the delinquencies "throws serious question" on the reliability of the Bank's reporting, he observes.

The Place for Privacy

There is "an obvious place for privacy in a free society, and in such critical parts of its governmental operations as the jury room and the polling booth," a political scientist argues. "The fact that privacy has its uses could hardly be challenged by any of the critics of executive secrecy. Congressmen, for example, commonly resort to secrecy to facilitate their own deliberations." Over the past seven years, more than one-third of congressional committee meetings were executive sessions. Newspapermen, too, "have been quick to claim the privilege of privacy in refusing to divulge the identity of confidential informants to the press. . . . The truth of the matter is that every major institution or profession in American life finds some measure of privacy useful for the achievement of its special objectives." (Francis E. Rourke, "Administrative Secrecy: A Congressional Dilemma," 54 *American Political Science Review* 684-694 (September, 1960).)

Rourke points out that Congress itself has many times restricted exposure of executive agency documents to the public—about private firms or individuals, inside dope which might benefit the official holding the information, and, of course, about national security. Following the "furor aroused by the *Jencks* decision . . . law enforcement officials in the executive branch actually asked for much less in the way of protection of their files than many Congressmen were prepared to give."

The House Subcommittee—Achievements and Plans

Looking at the results of the House subcommittee on government information's five year effort to open executive branch documents to the public, Rourke concludes that "administrative officials are quite defensive about withholding information and are reluctant to persist in practices of secrecy when these practices are exposed to public view . . ." But it is necessary to prod their con-

sciences. Although the subcommittee has failed to find a legal formula which shakes loose documents that the executive refuses to release, it has succeeded in making public a wide range of information which had been kept secret either thoughtlessly or through indifference to public information needs in competition with other administrative demands (as in declassifying defense documents). Altogether, Rourke feels, this watchdog function of the subcommittee "may in effect be regarded as a useful part of the check and balance system." The President "can . . . quite easily guard the confidential character of executive communications . . ." but congressional inquiry "unquestionably acts as a deterrent to any executive tendency to use privacy for the purpose of covering up blunders or to engage in self-serving publicity."

The subcommittee, however, continues to try to define in law its right to executive information. It is now considering a draft by a former newsman, now a law professor, of an amendment to the Administrative Procedures Act which would allow "any person" to get a court order to obtain a public record unless a law specifically exempts the record, unless it must be secret due to national defense, or unless "disclosure would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," such as unevaluated information against an employee. Particularly it aims to open to the public information about the internal decision processes of government which the executive branch has repeatedly refused to do on the grounds that employees will not give honest opinions in the policy consideration period if their views might be made public. (The subcommittee would welcome comments by public administration specialists on the draft bill. For a copy, write Samuel Archibald, Government Information Subcommittee, Room 218, George Washington Inn, Washington 25, D.C.)

Between the Official and the Public

One reason sometimes given for withholding news is that the information may not reach the public in a form the official would find accurate.

" . . . The suspicion with which the higher civil servant is apt to regard the newspaper is often perfectly justifiable," an Irish govern-

ment public relations man (the only one) wrote recently. Many a government expert, he relates, has been misunderstood by a well-meaning but little-understanding reporter, and a distorted newstory is hard to right once published. (Desmond Fricker, "The Government Department and the Press," 6 *Administration* 221-226 (Autumn, 1958).) The Alsops admit that "an immense amount of homework may be needed before the reporter has the necessary general grasp of the problem he wants the official or politician to talk about," and that often reporters do not have this grasp.

Even more critical, Robert Moses, who undoubtedly has maintained a positive public "image" through nearly half a century of public life, recently begged the American Society of Newspaper Editors to be concerned when covering government events about the need for obtaining good public career officials:

If they are repelled or driven out by essentially baseless criticisms, so-called disclosures and mud throwing, by near libel and slander, by undermining confidence, by making essential government services contemptible, where will you find the talent to beat the Russians?

Moses contended:

I have . . . never seen anything before equal in virulence and irresponsibility to the sensational yellow press of today, representing no doubt only a minority of all newspapers, but still an influential part of the whole. . . .

Baseless allegations are blown up as facts, trivial incidents magnified to giant size, reputations, years in building, ruthlessly attacked, and the denouement, payoff, exoneration and correction of the canard appears in small type in a few shamefaced, reluctant sentences on page thirty-six or forty opposite the stockyard prices or beside the obituaries. ("The Press and the Public Official," April 22, 1960, mimeo.)

Effects of institutional policies on news is under study constantly. After comparing the coverage of a number of outstanding newspapers from all over the world and finding it strikingly different in each, a scholar has remarked: ". . . As long as there has been such a thing as a newspaper, there has been the problem of what part of society controls it—who has the right to say what it prints? . . . The first and in some ways the most important way to distinguish one from another is in terms of who controls what each paper says,

and for what purpose is it being used? . . . [I]n general, a newspaper in a democracy speaks for its owner and publisher." (Wilbur Schramm, *One Day in the World's Press* (Stanford University Press, 1959).) Robert M. Hutchins adds, "Rising costs have put the publisher in the driver's seat . . .," and "as monopoly continues to spread, the ancient check of competition can of course no longer be relied on." (Speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 21, 1955.)

That this control can affect news presentation is suggested by a recent small study showing sharp variance in the coverage of the House investigation of the Federal Communications Commission by a Republican and an Independent Democratic newspaper in a single city. The issue was chosen for study because it could be seen in advance that the investigation was to implicate Republican administration officials.

The Independent Democratic newspaper used far more main headlines (13-5), other front-page heads (36-31), front-page space (242-184 column inches), and other space (1124-932 inches) on the hearing than the Republican paper. It used twice as many "loaded" words with unfavorable connotation to the FCC in headlines than the Republican paper (32-16) and fewer with favorable connotation (0-6). Similarly in the stories (241 to 170 unfavorable to FCC; 25 to 34 favorable).

After March 3, when Democratic senators were implicated in the pressure on the FCC, the Republican newspaper covered the hearings about the same as the Democratic newspaper by these measurements. But its coverage of the role of the Democratic senators was considerably heavier than the other paper's. (Bartlett H. Stoodley, "Bias in Reporting the FCC Investigation," 24 *Public Opinion Quarterly* 92-98 (Spring, 1960).)

Not confined to the U. S., the same concerns were expressed by a German public opinion researcher to the International Association for Mass Communication Research recently. Shortly after the French Revolution, she said, a scholar declared: "There would never have been a French Revolution if there had been a free press." In 1933, Germany proved that democracy could not be preserved by a free press alone, she continued, and today, the publishing world looks to many observers more

like a manufacturer than a reproducer of public opinion. Liberation by the press from despotic government is less an issue than "how we can liberate the individual from the spiritual despotism of mass communication media." (Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Mass Communication Media and Public Opinion," 36 *Journalism Quarterly* 401-409 (Fall, 1959).)

Apart from possible institutional bias or weakness, reporters carry the usual human prejudices. A recent study, basing its analysis on a survey of the imaginary audience for which newsmen write, found that there are two clearly distinguishable groups of reporters, one having a subconscious urge to win favor from the reader, one subconsciously seeking to demolish him. The researchers' hypothesis was supported by their findings—that news writers were "better able to communicate stories which fit their particular strategy of self-enhancement than stories which did not." Descriptions by reporters of their thoughts as they wrote stories showed that they had strong concern about the impact of what they were writing. The researchers found "a definite, though not always statistically significant, tendency for bad news to be more extensively distorted than good news" but either kind of news tends to be distorted "when not congruent with the individual's image flow." However, an experienced and highly professional news writer seems less likely to distort, and very brief, standard kinds of stories offer little scope for distortion. (Ithiel de Sola Pool and Irwin Shulman, "Newsmen's Fantasies, Audiences, and Newswriting," 23 *Public Opinion Quarterly* 145-158 (Summer, 1959).)

Two recent incidents illustrate the kinds of news coverage which make public administrators nervous:

1. In September, 1958, during a seeming threat to the islands of Matsu and Quemoy, "a 'lower-echelon' State Department mail worker had answered a 'routine' inquiry about the sentiment of mail on Quemoy in the regular way," as *Facts on File* recorded the incident. (Vol. 17, p. 313 (September 25-October 1).) The Vice President immediately called it a "patent and deliberate effort . . . to undercut the Secretary of State and sabotage his policy." The Secretary of State later said it was at least ill-advised, "not in what was given out, but what was not given out alongside of

it," i.e., what the negative letters seemed to intend and what interpretations might be put on the mail flow. He added that the statement "could have had, and perhaps had had, a very serious effect upon our negotiations. . . ." (Transcript of the Secretary's news conference, *New York Times*, October 1, 1958.)

2. Press treatment of the cranberry confiscation last year, which the *Wall Street Journal* quipped had cooked Secretary Flemming's goose in cranberry sauce, was called by *Consumer's Report* the main cause for the public's negative reaction to the action. ". . . Most readers were left in doubt about the facts of the case," CR said—for example, that Flemming "was required by law to seize the contaminated fruit," that if the weed killer had been used in accordance with Department of Agriculture directions there would have been no problem, and that the industry had been warned about violations before. (Vol. 25, p. 47-48 (January, 1960).)

Available but Ignored

Dean Barrett, too, found that "with notable exceptions, journalism is falling short of meeting" the responsibility of keeping public opinion well informed.

In all media, the public gets too much froth because too few want substance. In turn, the majority don't want substance partly because they are inadequately informed. The circle is vicious. ("Journalism Education Today," *Columbia University Bulletin*, February 27, 1960.)

In another article (applying press inadequacies to Latin American news), he continued:

The individual citizen is engulfed in print, pictures and sound. And yet he runs farther and farther behind the racing developments. . . .

. . . With a few notable exceptions, newspapers give relatively little space to news of the world and minute space to news of the other Americas. . . .

. . . The failure to provide the news perpetuates the ignorance of the reader, and this ignorance leads to the lack of interest.

Rourke similarly observed:

It is clear, for example, that in areas such as civil defense and urban redevelopment, government information programs have often been characterized by an inability to attract public attention, rather than by the excesses of any official propaganda machine.

In Milton Eisenhower's first report to the President on Latin America (quoted by Barrett and co-author Penn T. Kimball), he wrote: "It would be helpful if these media regularly found it possible to do more than report the spectacular occurrences in the Latin American countries. A revolution will merit widespread attention by the press, radio and television, but the long-term underlying causes may not. Yet the basic causes may have more to do with the future welfare of our country—and with international relationships—than did the revolution. . . ."

How break the vicious circle of ignorance leading to lack of interest and vice versa? Barrett and Kimball note that while our citizens have factual ignorance, public opinion polls do indicate substantial interest in Latin America. "Their ignorance may be a reflection of the quality of information they have been offered rather than an index of an inherent lack of interest." Barrett and Kimball sense "there is no dull news, just dull writing."

Reader interest can be built, they suspect. In a recent interview, many New Yorkers admitted that they read newspapers "to avoid seeming uninformed." Where newspapers do not have to play to the lowest common denominator to get subscribers (e.g., where they have a monopoly in town), they have the opportunity to develop knowledge on important topics by making it necessary for the "informed" person to know about them, Barrett and Kimball suggest. "Isolated experiments in improving the flow of news and background from the twenty American republics tend to" indicate that the circle can be broken by newspaper leadership. ("The Role of the Press and Communications," *The United States and Latin America* (American Assembly, Columbia University, 1959).)

That more citizens seem willing to try to wrestle with a serious version of public affairs might be hinted by the fact that in this country, "among newspapers, a few trailblazers are showing that responsible, intelligent journalism can also be profitable journalism," according to Barrett. He noted that "one of the nation's best small dailies" increased its circulation from 8,000 to 40,000 in twenty years; ". . . the estimable *New York Times* has in recent years outgained every New York paper in circulation and advertising"; "the *Wall*

Street Journal, with four regional editions . . . is demonstrating that quality journalism can be made to pay on a national basis." (*Bulletin, op. cit.*)

David Riesman also comments on ignorance and indifference:

It is hard for people like ourselves, in the educated upper middle class, to imagine the extent of the willingness of people to forget, to fail to register, to distort, and to overlook what all mass media seem so urgently to say, and even what events (as we ourselves react to them) seem to say.

The information they get is "entirely fragmented . . . snippets without context" and "people of limited education (but not necessarily limited intelligence) seldom have a framework in which to locate data which do not appear directly relevant." ". . . Living in Washington one may overestimate the extent of people's concern with the headlines and underestimate the enormous apathy which acts as a shield or buffer against information and, for the most part, against anxiety. Thus, it is possible for a Washington official to assume that people read editorials or listen to commentators, and that this or that policy is politically 'impossible' because Senator . . . Bridges might make a speech denouncing it. In fact, it may be more comforting for one's faith in democracy and popular government to believe that people care and are misinformed, than to realize how little they care and how little sense of responsibility they have learned to have beyond the suburb or beyond the township."

Trying "to bring into the political arena on foreign policy those strata which are presently apathetic" may even be dangerous because this group might not be able to endure unstructured situations and might precipitate imprudent decisions, such as preventive war. A danger of allowing general apathy to continue, however, is that "noncomplacent minorities, whether pacifists or officers of the Strategic Air Command, may be driven to impatience and to bad judgment by the lack of a larger audience which understands the issues between them."

Reaching the "Influentials"

Riesman would not seek a mass audience for the foreign policy debate. A certain amount of apathy is really "distrust of remote

influences which are not supported in the web of kinship and friendship," recent studies imply. Mass media influences opinion leaders who then influence their friends and families. The media support people "engaged in reaching other people," giving them arguments, a sense of mission, a sense that they do not work alone and unrecognized. "When supported in this way, it is often extraordinary what a single person can do who is intelligent and energetic, within his own circle."

Riesman advocates trying to reach small audiences with ideas that are not "truncated by the need to make them appealing to a mass audience." "Self-clarification" of a few may not save us, but "as infinitesimal in the beginning as a genetic mutation, . . . it may be of practical help." ("Private People and Public Policy," 15 *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 203-208 (May, 1959).)

The same array of research results is used by two public health professors to make similar proposals about conveying public health information. Mass media, they warn, usually do not reach the right people for public health purposes and apparently have little or no direct impact, but used to inform and support a group of local opinion leaders, they can be effective. Local health leaders or science writers are likely to have more influence than a scientist nationally reputed among scientists, but "the unrecognized leader in the local group may be more effective than either . . . with the group by whom he is trusted." In the face-to-face group, two-way communication can take place, and the recipient of the information can "test out new ideas verbally or in action before trying them out in life . . . [T]here may be a hidden network of these informal opinion leaders who are themselves affected by communications received through the mass media and who in turn influence others about them." The writers suggest that researchers find out what types of informal leaders exist on various subjects and whether government can use them more effectively. (William Griffiths and Andie L. Knutson, "The Role of Mass Media in Public Health," 50 *American Journal of Public Health* 515-523 (April, 1960).)

Both of these articles are based in large part on Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence* (Free Press, 1955). Katz ex-

plains the new thinking: "Until very recently, the image of society in the minds of most students of communication was of atomized individuals, connected with the mass media but not with one another." When mass media were found to be "far less potent than had been expected," researchers discovered the role of interpersonal relations in acceptance and resistance to new ideas. Reinforcing research on the impact of mass media are experience and research of a different group of scholars—on changing farm methods. With the combined findings, it seems an "undeniable fact that interpersonal communication plays a major role in social and technical change both in the city and on the farm." Mass media are more effective in the earlier stages of decision-making—becoming aware of and interested in an innovation and evaluating it—rather than in the later stages—final acceptance of a new idea. Early adopters are "cosmopolitan" types, generally influenced by outside, formal communication; later adopters are influenced by closer, more personal sources. ("Communication Research and the Image of Society: Convergence of Two Traditions," 65 *American Journal of Sociology* 435-440 (March, 1960).)

(Perhaps this new conception of how the public receives information implies that we can gradually achieve real understanding of some issues via the two-tier process without serious damage resulting from opening half-understood information to the mass public. Withholding and manipulating news to achieve a reaction without real understanding may not be necessary if more thorough education of opinion leaders over a period of time is possible while other citizens, though not understanding, remain indifferent.)

Critique of "Little Hoover" Commissions: They Missed Main Issues on Personnel

Although thirty-three states have received forty-two "Little Hoover" Commission reports since the prototype Hoover Commission was created in 1947, very few real improvements have resulted; this is the fault of the reports rather than the indifference of the citizenry, according to Gladys M. Kammerer, director of the University of Florida Public Administration Clearing Service.

Most of the studies bogged down in relatively

unimportant details, she asserted—recommendations for interdepartmental personnel councils, internal reorganizations of personnel agencies, a change in the number of successful examinees certified, etc. while the fundamental weaknesses of state personnel systems were ignored. For example, six commissions completely overlooked the widespread spoils system operating in their state governments but carefully explored job classification needs. (Two state commissions did recommend broad merit-system laws and Nevada passed one, however.)

A second major need overlooked is hiring competent college seniors; Miss Kammerer chided the many businessmen on the commissions for neglecting to recommend campus recruitment though their firms depend upon it. Also, the reports dwelt at length on firing incompetents while overlooking the development of competence through training (mentioned in only one report), although, again, "businessmen from large corporations [are] quite accustomed to spending large sums on a dazzling variety of training courses. . . ."

In the one major question on which many commissions took a stand, there was no clear trend nor adequate justification for recommendations, Miss Kammerer contended. Eight commissions called for transfer of personnel functions to a department of administration or a fiscal agency and in a ninth state a follow-up executive study committee made the same recommendation. On the other hand, Connecticut separated its personnel agency from a primarily fiscal department and eight other state commissions called for separate personnel agencies.

Short of a merit system plus intensive recruitment of college graduates, it is rare to achieve any progress in state administration and policy, since second-rate persons at higher levels hesitate to take on first-rate subordinates, Miss Kammerer observed. Only occasionally do capable administrators appear—entering above the entrance level—to "win the confidence of legislators, press, and public to the extent that they can obtain new programs, new organizations, and additional powers to meet their problems more effectively." ("Opportunities Missed: The 'Little Hoover Commission' Reports," 21 *Public Personnel Review* 235-242 (October, 1960).)

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